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WHAT THE RIGHT HAND GIVES:
PROHIBITIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL
Ariana Lindermayer*
Most state constitutions include a right-to-bail provision, commonly
phrased, "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for
[certain offenses] when the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption
great." This Note examines conflicting interpretations of the effect this
provision has on the cases excluded from its guarantee-specifically,
certain offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great. Some
courts read this provision to be silent regarding the excepted cases,
allowing the legislature and judiciary to decide whether to permit bail.
Others reason that the plain language of this right to bail is prohibitive
with respect to the excepted cases even if the court concludes that the
accused does not pose a risk offlight or danger. This Note concludes that
the grammatical structure and history of this provision support the former,
permissive interpretation. It further warns against reducing the standard
for denial of bail to the strength of the proof of guilt alone, arguing that the
bail decision should reflect the purposes of bail-to ensure the accused's
presence at trial and safety of the community-lest the practice venture into
the dangerous territory ofpreconviction punishment.
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RIGHT TO BAIL
INTRODUCTION
Jeffrey Browne, a Virgin Islands police officer on sick leave, was
arrested after a drive-by shooting in a small housing community on
Christmas morning left two dead and four wounded.' Under the Virgin
Islands statute, he would be presumptively eligible for bail, unless the
government could show he posed a risk of flight or danger to the
community.2 The statute specified several factors for the court to consider
in making its determination, including his family ties, employment,
financial resources, character, and length of residence in the community. 3
Born and raised on St. Croix, home to his family, Browne had served on the
police force for six years.4 At his bail hearing, several residents of the
island testified to his good character and strong community ties.5 His
parents offered to act as his third-party custodians and to post two parcels
of property as bail.6 Browne was also willing to surrender his passport and
submit to home detention and electronic monitoring. 7
Unfortunately for Browne, he faced two counts of first-degree murder
because these homicides occurred during the commission of a first-degree
assault. 8 As a result, if the prosecution had a strong enough case at the
outset, conditional release under the territorial statute simply would not be
an option.9 The trial court would be obligated to detain Browne, even if
satisfied that, if released, he would appear at trial and pose no threat to the
public. 10 Tying the court's hands would be the strangest of culprits-the
right-to-bail provision in the Virgin Islands' de facto constitution, the
Revised Organic Act. 1
1. Browne v. People, No. 2008-022, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33, at *3 (Aug. 29,
2008).
2. The Virgin Islands Code provides for pretrial detention of a person charged with a
dangerous crime, including first-degree murder, only if the government shows that "there is
no one condition or combination of conditions which will reasonably assure the safety of the
community or ... that the person charged will appear for trial." V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §
3504a(a)(1) (1982).
3. Id.
4. Fiona Stokes-Gifft, Family Outraged When Court Closes Hearing on Christmas Day
Murders, V.I. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 3, 2008, at 9, available at http://www.virginislands
dailynews.com/index.pl/article home?id= 17619082.
5. Browne, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33, at *5.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at *3, *45.
9. Id. at *9.
10. The court ultimately remanded the case to determine whether the government met its
burden of proof that Browne's guilt was evident or the presumption thereof great. Id at *49.
11. Congress passed the Revised Organic Act in 1954, and later amended it in 1984.
Pub. L. No. 83-517, 68 Stat. 497 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (2006)); Pub. L.
No. 98-454, 98 Stat. 1737 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (2006)). The people of the Virgin
Islands cannot amend the Organic Act, although courts refer to it as the "unofficial
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Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act, titled "Rights and Prohibitions,"
reads, "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties ... , except for
first-degree murder or any capital offense when the proof is evident or the
presumption great."' 12 In Browne v. People,13 the Supreme Court of the
Virgin Islands interpreted this right-to-bail provision to prohibit bail for
defendants charged with first-degree murder when the proof is evident.14
Read this way, the provision preempted the legislature's ability to set
guidelines for bail in exceptional cases where less restrictive conditions
would still ensure the defendant's presence at trial and the safety of the
community. 15 In essence, the court shifted the focus of the conversation.
The strength of the evidence went from being one of many factors for the
court to consider in deciding whether the defendant poses a flight risk or
danger, to being the sole determinant in the bail decision for capital
defendants. Even though the right-to-bail provision guarantees the people a
right that did not exist before, as a result of the Virgin Islands Supreme
Court's interpretation, when the proof is evident, capital defendants lose
their opportunity for bail.
At the heart of the Browne case is the effect of the right-to-bail provision
on legislative and judicial discretion to determine whether bail is ever
appropriate in the cases excluded from its guarantee. Alabama, California,
Florida, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, and Vermont have read their constitutions to leave
room for either the legislature or the court to determine whether to allow
bail in the excepted cases. 16 Arizona, Colorado, and Pennsylvania, on the
other hand, join the Virgin Islands in holding that nearly identical
provisions preclude this possibility, prohibiting bail for certain defendants
when the proof is evident or the presumption great. 17
To be sure, it is unusual for a judge to make an evidentiary finding
against a defendant, determining that the proof of guilt is evident, and yet
still feel compelled to grant bail. 18  When this situation does occur,
constitution." People v. Dowdye, 48 V.I. 47, 56 (Super. Ct. 2006). Representatives of the
people of the Virgin Islands are currently drafting a constitution for the territory. Susan
Mann, Final USVI Constitution Draft Sent to Government House, CARIBBEAN NET NEWS,
June 5, 2009, http://www.caribdaily.com/article/167971/final-usvi-constitution-draft-sent-to-
government-house/.
12. Revised Organic Act § 3, 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (2006).
13. 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33.
14. Id. at *9.
15. Id. *29-30.
16. See infra Part II.A.I-II.A.11.
17. See infra Part II.B.I-II.B.4.
18. See People v. Dist. Court, 529 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Colo. 1974) (en banc) ("It occurs to
us that it must be a rare instance when a court admits a defendant to bail in a capital case
after making evidentiary finding adverse to the defendant. Most of the cases appear to be
concerned with a matter in which some discretion is vested in the trial judge-the finding
whether proof is evident or the presumption great.").
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however, mandatory detention would have enormous implications for the
defendant, depriving him of liberty before judgment, and hindering his
ability to assist in his own defense. 19 This question is also deeply relevant
to society at large, forcing us to reevaluate basic assumptions about state
bail law in light of fundamental principles of justice, such as separation of
powers and the presumption of innocence.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of this ambiguous state right to
bail, including the common-law bail system out of which it emerged. It
ends with a state-by-state analysis of the intersecting constitutional
provisions, penal statutes, and case law, to determine in how many
jurisdictions this question is relevant. Part II first organizes the
jurisdictions whose courts have addressed this conflict into two categories:
those that have clearly stated, in holding or dicta, that the constitutional
provision is discretionary; and those that have clearly stated, in holding or
dicta, that the constitutional provision is prohibitive. Part II then examines
a third category of opinions that seem to assume one of these interpretations
but do not consider the alternative, as well as the implications of recent
state constitutional amendments on the present conflict. Part III argues that
the right-to-bail provision preserves the discretion to grant or deny bail in
the excepted cases, and that, while the proof of guilt is an important factor,
the purposes of bail must drive the ultimate decision in every case.
I. EXAMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR BAIL
Bail may seem perfunctory-until, that is, you get arrested. Then, it can
become a matter of life and death. Besides the immediate loss of liberty
and lasting financial impact on your family, pretrial detention may also
diminish your hopes of ultimate acquittal by hindering the ability to
participate actively in your own defense. 20 Part L.A begins with a basic
description of a defendant's options while awaiting trial. Part I.B goes on
to describe the common-law background that sets the context for
understanding modem bail provisions. Part I.C provides a state-by-state
analysis that isolates the jurisdictions in which this question remains
relevant yet unanswered, and Part I.D introduces a recent trend in state
constitutions.
A. The Basics of Bail
Between arrest and trial, most defendants will be released on their own
recognizance 2' or will have the opportunity to post bail. 22 Traditionally,
19. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (attributing the correlation between release
and conviction to the increased ability to assist in one's own defense).
20. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
21. In this case, also called an "unsecured appearance bond," the accused takes an oath
pledging his appearance at trial, and only pays a fixed monetary amount if the court orders it
2009]
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bail has taken various forms designed to ensure the defendant's presence at
trial, 23 from a financial exchange2 4 to the posting of the defendant's or a
close relative's property.25 In order to persuade the court, the accused may
also agree to certain conditions for release, such as electronic monitoring,
drug testing, or a curfew, among others.26 If the court is not satisfied that
any of these conditions will ensure the defendant's presence, he may be
detained. 27 At the end of trial, the accused generally receives his bail,
whether convicted or acquitted, unless he fails to make all necessary
appearances or fulfill the court's other guidelines, in which case he risks
forfeiture. 28
forfeited. See, e.g., Esmond Harmsworth, Bail and Detention: An Assessment and Critique
of the Federal and Massachusetts Systems, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
213, 214 (1996); Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 966, 966 (1961)
[hereinafter Bail]; Robert Webster Oliver, Bail and the Concept of Preventative Detention,
N.Y. ST. B.J., Sept./Oct. 1997, at 8, 8.
22. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 150 (8th ed. 2004) (defining bail as a "security such
as cash or a bond ... required by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear at a
future time"); Boon-Tiong Lim et al., The Economics of Bail Setting and Social Welfare, 25
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 592, 593 (2005).
23. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.01 (Vernon 2005); A. HIGHMORE, A
DIGEST OF THE DOCTRINE OF BAIL; IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES vi (1791), reprinted in
CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MODERN ERA (David S. Berkowitz & Samuel
E. Thorne eds., 1978); CHARLES PETERSDORFF, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAIL,
IN CIVIL AMD CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 475 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son 1824); Alan
L. Zegas, Bail in the State and Federal Courts, N.J. LAW., Feb./Mar. 1994, at 21, 22; John S.
Goldkamp, Bail-The Purposes of the Bail or Pretrial Release Decision, The Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution and Defendant Rights,
http://law.jrank.org/pages/563/Bail.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
24. Joseph Buro, Note, Bail-Defining Sufficient Sureties: The Constitutionality of
Cash-Only Bail, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1407, 1407 (2004).
25. A "surety" is a responsible third party, whether a relative or a bail bondsperson, who
guarantees the defendant's appearance at trial and agrees to be responsible for his debt if he
flees. Id.
26. Several statutes, including the Federal Bail Reform Act, allow the court to choose
the least restrictive condition or set of conditions that will still ensure the defendant's
presence at trial and the safety of the community. See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18
U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006).
27. See id.
28. See Oliver, supra note 21, at 8.
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Bail is not punitive. 29 As mentioned above, courts have long stated that
its primary purpose is to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial. 30 In
practice, however, many courts have also reserved the right to adjust or
deny bail if the accused may threaten the safety of the community or the
integrity of the judicial process (by, for example, interfering with
witnesses). 31 If the court denies bail altogether, this detention is civil, not
criminal, as it is prospective and preventative. 3 2 At the same time, courts
still frequently refer to the presumption of innocence as a strong reason to
grant bail. 33 (The other reason courts most often consider is that release on
bail allows the defendant to assist best in his own defense by making him
more readily available to his counsel and by freeing him to initiate his own
investigation.). 34
29. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47 (1987) ("To determine
whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or permissible
regulation, we first look to legislative intent.... We conclude that the detention imposed by
the Act falls on the regulatory side of the dichotomy."); State v. Pray, 346 A.2d 227, 229-30
(Vt. 1975); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *300 ("Upon the whole, if the offence
be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail, he is to be committed to the county [jail] by...
the justice ... there to abide till delivered by due course of law. But this imprisonment, as
has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for punishment ...."). But see Salerno, 481
U.S. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The majority proceeds as though the only substantive
right protected by the Due Process Clause is a right to be free from punishment before
conviction. The majority's technique for infringing this right is simple: merely redefine any
measure which is claimed to be punishment as 'regulation,' and, magically, the Constitution
no longer prohibits its imposition.").
30. See, e.g., People v. Purcell, 778 N.E.2d 695, 700 (I1l. 2002); In re Wheeler, 406 P.2d
713, 716 (Nev. 1965); State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 250 (N.J. 1972) (explaining that the
right to bail excludes capital cases because the temptation to flee is greatest when one's life
is at stake); Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 296 A.2d 829, 834 (Pa. 1972).
31. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (upholding preventive detention based on the likelihood of
defendant's future dangerousness).
32. See, e.g., id.; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536-37 (1979); L.O.W. v. Dist. Court of
Arapahoe, 623 P.2d 1253, 1256 (Colo. 1981).
33. There is considerable disagreement about the propriety of applying this presumption
pretrial. While some courts reason that the presumption of innocence applies to all phases of
a criminal proceeding, others limit it to the trial itself, sometimes even adopting a
presumption of guilt for the purposes of bail. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)
(stating that, without the right to bail, "the presumption of innocence, secured only after
centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning."); In re Knast, 614 P.2d 2, 3 (Nev. 1980);
Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment's Right
to Bail, 32 N. Ky. L. REV. 1, 10 (2005) (arguing that the presumption of innocence must
apply at all stages of the judicial process to'be meaningful). But see Ford v. Dilley, 156 N.W.
513, 521 (Iowa 1916); State v. Green, 275 So. 2d 184, 186 (La. 1973) ("There is little
relationship between the right to bail and the presumption of innocence. The [latter]...
protects against conviction, not against arrest.").
34. See Boyle, 342 U.S. at 4; Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court:
Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1052 (1954); Harmsworth,
supra note 21, at 218; Lester, supra note 33 (arguing that defendants granted pretrial release
are less likely to be convicted because they put a greater burden on the government to prove
its case); Bail, supra note 21, at 969, 976.
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B. The Constitutional Right-to-Bail Provision
1. The History
The U.S. Constitution does not guarantee the right to bail. 35 The Eighth
Amendment provides that, when bail is granted, "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required."' 36 It is silent, however, as to the initial determination of
whether to grant bail at all. The U.S. Supreme Court has long dismissed the
argument that the Eighth Amendment implies that the absolute denial of
bail (the most "excessive" of bails) is likewise prohibited. 37 In 1789, the
same year it introduced the Bill of Rights, Congress enacted the Federal
Judiciary Act. 38 This Act conferred the right to bail on all noncapital
defendants, while preserving the court's discretion to grant or deny bail in
capital cases. 39 The Bail Reform Act has replaced the bail provisions of the
Judiciary Act with a standard for release based on the least restrictive
condition, or set of conditions, that will ensure the defendant's appearance
at trial and the safety of the community. 40
Like the U.S. Constitution, several state constitutions only prohibit
excessive bail without guaranteeing any right to bail. 41 A majority of
states, however, have adopted stronger protections than those secured by
federal law, by guaranteeing a constitutional right to bail in noncapital
cases. 42 Most of these bail provisions (and the 1787 bill of rights of the
35. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752; Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
37. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752 ("[The Excessive Bail] Clause, of course, says
nothing about whether bail shall be available at all."); Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545-46.
Interestingly, on appeal, Salerno conceded that this implicit right to bail extended only to
noncapital offenses. Brief for Respondent at 21, Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (No. 86-87).
38. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.) ("And upon all arrests in criminal cases, bail shall be admitted, except
where the punishment may be death, in which cases it shall not be admitted but by [the
judges of certain courts,] who shall exercise their discretion therein, regarding the nature and
circumstances of the offence, and of the evidence, and the usages of law.").
39. Id. Several courts and scholars have reasoned that, by guaranteeing a right to bail in
the Judiciary Act, the Framers demonstrated their awareness of the distinction between the
right to bail and a prohibition against excessive bail. The exclusion of any express right to
bail in the Constitution, therefore, must have been intentional. See, e.g., United States v.
Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 12.3(c) (4th ed. 2004). Contra Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis
in Bail: 1, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 972 (1965) (discussing the scant record of any debate in
Congress on the right-to-bail provision of the Judiciary Act or the Excessive Bail Clause of
the Eighth Amendment, and overall lack of evidence of any intention to exclude such a
right).
40. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006).
41. See, e.g., State v. Pett, 92 N.W.2d 205, 206 (Minn. 1958); see infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389, 1393 n.16 (Alaska 1974); Commonwealth
v. Baker, 177 N.E.2d 783, 786 (Mass. 1961); 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 39, § 12.4(a);
Foote, supra note 39, at 977.
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Northwest Ordinance 43) are modeled after the Pennsylvania Frame of
Government of 168244: "all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties, unless for capital offences, where the proof is evident, or the
presumption great .... ,,45 This right to bail prevents the legislature from
prohibiting bail in all cases except for capital offenses and, even then, only
when the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great.
Although the constitutional standard is based on the strength of the proof
of guilt, courts adamantly warn that this finding reflects the defendant's
incentive to flee or potential dangerousness, due to the higher likelihood of
conviction for a serious crime. 46 It refers to the strength of the case against
the defendant rather than his ultimate guilt or innocence. This basic
framework has survived until today, despite significant expansion of the
43. Some early courts cited article 2 of this ordinance (formally called the Ordinance for
the Government of the Territories of the United States North-West of the River Ohio) as the
first occurrence of the language at dispute in this Note. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 93 P. 980,
981 (Okla. 1908) (referring to the Northwest Ordinance as the "first appearance" of this
wording in American statutory or constitutional law and stating that the provision is
expressly incorporated into at least half of the states' constitutions and is the rule of practice
in all the rest).
44. See Buro, supra note 24, at 1412; Heath Coffman, Note, A Look at the New Texas
Constitutional Article J, Section JIB, 59 BAYLOR L. REv. 241, 245-46 (2007).
45. Foote, supra note 39, at 975; Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the
Bail Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive
Bail Clause, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 121, 129 (2009). For ease of reading, this Note uses the
phrase "disputed language" to refer to the basic grammatical structure "shall be bailable ...
except." The "excepted cases" refer to those offenses excluded from the bail guarantee-
that is, whatever follows the "except" in the disputed language, including both the class of
offense and any qualifier, most commonly that the proof is evident or the presumption great.
This Note focuses on those provisions that preserve this disputed language, absent further
direction on how to handle the excepted cases. That is, a bail provision that goes on to
specify that bail shall be denied in capital offenses when the proof is evident is irrelevant to
the present study. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. To clarify, the excepted
cases in one state may be only capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great, but in another jurisdiction they may also include sexual assault when the proof is
evident or the presumption great, or simply any felony where the person has already been
convicted of a felony offense. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., In re Steigler, 250 A.2d 379, 383 (Del. 1969); Bergna v. State, 102 P.3d
549, 552 (Nev. 2004) (noting the relevance of the strength of the evidence of guilt to the
defendant's potential danger if released); State v. Konigsberg, 164 A.2d 740, 745 (N.J.
1960) ("Guilt or innocence is not the issue; there can be no evaluation of evidence with that
result in mind ...."); In re West, 88 N.W. 88, 90 (N.D. 1901). If this nuanced distinction
seems confusing, imagine a murder case in which the judge is absolutely certain that the
defendant is innocent, yet the prosecution has an exceptionally strong case. In other words,
even though the judge knows the accused is not guilty, the proof of guilt is evident. In a
jurisdiction that interprets the constitutional provision to prohibit bail in the excepted cases,
the judge must deny bail. The reasoning is that, even though the defendant is innocent, the
strength of the case against him alone will tempt him to flee or otherwise obstruct justice. In
this manner, the decision whether the proof of guilt is evident is divorced from an inquiry
into the defendant's actual guilt or innocence.
2009]
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category of offenses in which the courts may-or, depending on the
jurisdiction, must--deny bail. 47
Courts disagree about whether this right to bail is absolute or
conditional. 48  Jurisdictions in which the right is absolute read the
qualification of "sufficient sureties" to mean that the court can detain the
defendant only if he is unable to post the amount of bail that it sets. 49
Courts that interpret the right as conditional read this qualification to mean
that the court always retains discretion to deny bail, even in the cases
covered by the bail guarantee, if unconvinced that any amount of bail will
assure the defendant's appearance at trial. 50 The position that the right to
bail is only conditional does not necessarily compel the conclusion that the
court must deny bail in the excepted cases. Rather, under this
understanding the focus may simply shift in the excepted cases. That is, for
bailable cases, the court would need an extraordinary reason to deny bail,
whereas for the excepted cases, the court would need an extraordinary
reason to grant bail.
2. The Language
The right-to-bail provision's archaic wording 5' poses several linguistic
challenges beyond the inherent tension of weighing the presumption of guilt
while avoiding a determination of guilt. Courts have traditionally read
"shall" as compulsory. 52 Complicating the present question somewhat, the
disputed language involves not just "shall" or its negation, which
47. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Sprinkle v. State, 368 So. 2d 554, 559 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); Duncan v.
State, 823 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ark. 1992). Contra Rendel v. Mummert, 474 P.2d 824, 828
(Ariz. 1970); People ex rel. Hemingway v. Elrod, 322 N.E.2d 837, 840-41 (Ill. 1975).
49. See, e.g., Sprinkle, 368 So. 2d at 559 (holding that the right is absolute, provided the
defendant can make bail).
50. See, e.g., Rendel, 474 P.2d at 828 (defining "sufficient sureties" as a reasonable
assurance to the court that the defendant will appear for trial if admitted to bail).
51. See Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478, 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (Foreman, J.,
concurring); State v. Kastanis, 848 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1993).
52. See, e.g., Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 346 (2005);
Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001); State v. Sutherland, 987 P.2d 501, 503 (Or.
1999); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 1407 (8th ed. 2004) (noting that the
obligatory meaning of "shall" is the only acceptable definition "under strict standards of
drafting"). While scholars have critiqued the common assumption that the word "shall" is
imperative, the argument that it has also taken on a permissive meaning applies to
contemporary usage and is not relevant to interpreting a provision that originated in the
seventeenth century. BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER'S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 720-21
(2003). But see Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528, 534 (1930) (stating that
"shall" is equivalent to "may" in certain situations).
A related question is whether "may" is permissive. Although not directly relevant to
the constitutional provision, this ambiguity surfaces in the penal statutes and the case law.
E.g., State v. Kauffman, 108 N.W. 246, 246 (S.D. 1906). Contra Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v.
Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 198-99 (2000) (noting that "the mere use of 'may' is
not necessarily" intended to be permissive or discretionary).
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presumably is "shall not," but rather something broader-not the opposite
of "shall" but an exception carved out of "shall": "shall be bailable...
unless [or except]." '53
In addition, "bailable" may mean entitled to bail 54 or simply eligible for
bail. 55  The choice between these definitions is connected to the
interpretation of the right to bail as either absolute ("entitled to bail") or
conditional ("eligible for bail"). 56 If the right to bail is conditional, then the
provision merely guarantees the defendant the opportunity to be considered
for bail. That is, the legislature cannot outright prohibit bail as a matter of
law but, because the accused would only be "eligible," the court could
ultimately deny bail anyway. As discussed in the previous section, the
distinction between these two positions regarding the bailable cases is not
dispositive of the treatment of the excepted cases. 57 Because this provision
involves an exception carved out of "shall be bailable," rather than its
complete negation, the fact that bailable defendants are guaranteed
eligibility for bail does not logically imply that nonbailable defendants are
necessarily ineligible.
Structurally, the beginning of the right-to-bail provision (usually "all
persons shall be bailable") is the operative clause. 58 The clause acts upon
the bailable cases, to which it extends the right to bail, and out of which it
carves an exception. 59 As a result, the language is grammatically silent
53. See, e.g., In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 64 (Minn. 2008) (holding that
exceptions from a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly); McNeil v.
Hansen, 731 N.W.2d 273, 276-77 (Wis. 2007) (holding that exceptions within a statute
should be strictly interpreted). One court, for example, read "shall" as mandatory, expressly
holding that the language is not discretionary and that the exception carved out from "shall"
is also mandatory. State v. Garrett, 493 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
54. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 133 S.W. 1017, 1018 (Ark. 1911); Fredette v. State, 428
A.2d 395, 406 (Me. 1981); Sutherland, 987 P.2d at 503; Oliver, supra note 21, at 8. Several
states have modernized their constitutional provisions in order to eliminate this archaic and
confusing language. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11 (reading "entitled ... to be
released" instead of "shall be bailable"); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("shall be released");
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("shall have a right ... to be released"); FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 14
("[S]hall be entitled to pretrial release"); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("[O]ught to be bailed"); Wis.
CONST. art. I, § 8 ("[S]hall be eligible for release"); P.R. CONST. art. I1, § 11 ("[S]hall be
entitled to be admitted to bail").
55. See, e.g., Watts v. Grimes, 161 S.E.2d 286, 287 (Ga. 1968); Parker v. Roth, 278
N.W.2d 106, 115 (Neb. 1979); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 150.
56. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hemingway v. Elrod, 322 N.E.2d 837, 840 (I11. 975). But
see Ex parte Colbert, 805 So. 2d 687, 688 (Ala. 2001); Fredette, 428 A.2d at 406 (holding
that murder is not a "bailable" offense because the accused does not have an absolute right to
bail).
57. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
58. See Fredette, 428 A.2d at 402 (analyzing the grammatical relationship between the
two clauses forming the disputed language).
59. See People v. Purcell, 778 N.E.2d 695, 700 (II. 2002) (holding that the disputed
language "creates a rebuttable presumption that the accused is eligible for bail").
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with respect to the excepted cases contained in the subsidiary clause. 60
Courts often refer to the common law to fill in gaps in statutory text. 61 The
state of bail at common law, therefore, provides the necessary background
for understanding the intended implications of this provision on the
excepted cases.
C. The State of Bail at Common Law
Two things are striking about the history of bail at common law: (1) the
only limitation on the authority to grant bail was by statute62; and (2) these
statutes did not limit the discretion of the judges of the Court of King's
Bench, only of the sheriffs and the justices of the peace. 63
1. English Common Law
At early common law, bail in criminal cases was entirely discretionary;
every defendant was eligible for bail before conviction. 64 Even people
accused of homicides could seek release through a writ de odio et atia ("for
hatred and malice"), 65 the forerunner to the writ of habeas corpus. 66 A
sheriff could grant the writ de odio et atia upon determining that the charge
was malicious and baseless, either because the defendant was not guilty or
because he had a justifiable defense. 67 Although the writ seems to carry a
rather clear standard for granting bail-whether the charge is baseless-
sheriffs considered additional factors in granting or denying bail, including
the circumstances and character of the person charged. 68
60. Cf U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."); Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (repealed 1873) (authorizing
but not requiring the President to suspend the writ during the Civil War when necessary for
the public safety and placing restrictions on this suspension).
61. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 447 (2003);
United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993); see also Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill
Mach. Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1959) (refusing to construe a statute in derogation of
the common law unless expressly stated).
62. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *298.
63. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 997 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that
historically, denial of bail was left to a court's discretion in capital cases, depending on the
accused's risk of flight); BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *299; 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 93, 98 (London, A.J. Valpy 1816).
64. CHITTY, supra note 63, at 93; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 476; see United States
v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Street v. State, 43 Miss. 1, 29 (1870);
BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *298 ("By the ancient common law ... all felonies were
bailable, till murder was excepted by statute .... "); HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at vii; Thos.
F. Davidson, The Power of Courts To Let To Bail, 24 AM. L. REG. 1, 1 (1876).
65. PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 476.
66. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 467-68.
67. PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 476.
68. Id. at 477.
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By Charles Petersdorff's account, this standard gave way to the sheriffs
ultimate discretion: "The privilege of obtaining the writ de odio et atia was
in the time of [Lord] Bracton unrestricted, and in all other instances an
uncontrolled discretionary power was vested in the sheriffs, of liberating
persons charged with crimes of the utmost enormity. '69 Lacking a clear
standard, sheriffs often abused their discretion, leading to inconsistent,
oppressive, and overly frequent use of the writ.7 0
Lord Edward Coke qualifies Petersdorff's observations, noting that the
courts generally followed a rule, articulated by Lord Bracton, that "in every
wrong and [trespass] against the Peace of the King, although the offence
reach to [felony], every one that is appealed or indicted (is wont to [be]
Bailed) except only in the case of the death of a man. ' 71 The ultimate
discretion of the court to grant bail led to a "diversity of opinions, '72 out of
which patterns of judicial custom emerged.
Both scholars agree, however, that a complicated statutory scheme
developed to eliminate this unregulated and often arbitrary exercise of
discretion, beginning with statutes that implemented the Magna Carta's
prohibition against excessive fines. 73 In 1275, the Statute of Westminster 74
revolutionized the bail system, precisely defining three categories of
offenses: those in which the defendant must be admitted to bail, may be
admitted to bail, and cannot be admitted to bail. 75 The latter category was
the largest, including all capital offenses and other serious crimes, unless
the accusation was of "light suspicion," or not well founded, in which case
the decision to admit to bail was discretionary. 76 Because so many felonies
69. Id. at 476-77.
70. See PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 477; Buro, supra note 24, at 1411.
71. See SIR EDWARD COKE, A LITTLE TREATISE OF BAILE AND MAINEPRIZE 4 (London,
William Cooke 1635), reprinted in CLASSICS OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MODERN
ERA (David S. Berkowitz & Samuel E. Thome eds., 1978); see also HIGHMORE, supra note
23, at vii (explaining that, initially, bail was so favored that increases in corruption and
population made it necessary to impose restrictions, starting with murder cases).
72. COKE, supra note 71, at 4.
73. See MAGNA CARTA, ch. 14 (1215) ("A Free-man shall not be amerced for a small
fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving
to him his contenement .... ); COKE, supra note 71, at 3-4, 22-23; PETERSDORFF, supra 23,
at 477; see also PHILIP WYATT CROWTHER, THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF ARREST IN
PERSONAL ACTIONS 10 n.n (London, J & W.T. Clarke 1828) ("Anciently felonies were
bailable by the sheriff, before actual conviction .... The sheriffs power of so bailing was
abolished by [the Statute of Westminster].").
74. Statute of Westminster 1, 1275, 3 Edw., ch. 15 (Eng.).
75. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *298; CHITTY, supra note 63, at 95-97;
HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 150-51; see also PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 489-99.
76. 3 Edw., ch. 15. The relevant portion of the Statute of Westminster reads as follows:
"[S]uch prisoners as before were outlawed, and they which have abjured the realm,
provors, and such as be taken with the manour, and those which have broken the
King's prison, thieves openly defamed and known, and such as be appealed by
provors, so long as the provors be living ... and such as be taken for house-
burning feloniously done, or for false money, or for counterfeiting the King's seal,
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were punishable by death at that time, 77 bail was guaranteed only for minor
offenses. 7 8
As a result of Westminster, bail went from entirely discretionary to "only
allowed where manifest injustice would accrue from the privilege being
withheld."'79 Suspicious of the flexibility that previously dominated, the
legislature used the category of offense, sometimes qualified by the
probability of guilt, as a proxy for the likelihood that the accused would
actually appear for trial.80 As a practical matter, commentators at that time
viewed the risk of flight when charged with a capital offense to be so great
that no bail could serve as security equivalent to the actual custody of the
person. 8' It was, therefore, by statute and not by common law that
entitlement or eligibility for bail became contingent on the category of
offense charged. 82
Mistrust of the justices of the peace propelled the ensuing statutory
scheme.83 After Westminster, additional procedural requirements were
necessary to ensure compliance with its guidelines.84 Subsequent statutes
or persons excommunicate, taken at the request of the bishop, or for manifest
offences, or for treason touching the King himself, shall be in no wise replevisable
by the common writ, nor without writ... but such as be indicted of [certain petty
offenses] shall from henceforth be let out by sufficient surety ......
Id.; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *298-99 (listing offenses made bailable and
nonbailable by the Statute of Westminster); HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 150-51;
PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 477-78.
77. There were more than two hundred capital crimes in English common law; in
American colonial common law, this number dropped to fewer than twenty. Simpson v.
Owens, 85 P.3d 478, 485 & n.8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
78. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *298; HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 150-51.
79. PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 476.
80. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *298-99; HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 149-51,
173.
81. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *297; HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 170;
PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 475-76. At common law, defendants in civil actions were
bailable in all cases. Civil actions have long been treated differently because, in the event of
nonappearance, the sureties posted as bail could adequately compensate the plaintiff for his
injuries, while no bail is equivalent to the public safety threatened by the flight of a criminal
defendant. In civil actions, therefore, bail accomplishes the same goal as detention would.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *297; HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 170; PETERSDORFF,
supra note 23, at 475-76.
82. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *298 ("But the statute [of Westminster] takes
away the power of bailing in treason, and in [diverse] instances of felony.").
83. See HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at vii; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 477; Buro,
supra note 24, at 1411. The Statute of Westminster also provided that a sheriff who released
nonbailable defendants "shall lose his fee and office for ever." Statute of Westminster I,
1275, 3 Edw., ch. 15 (Eng.); see also HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 151 (describing the fines
imposed on justices of the peace for improperly bailing nonbailable defendants). "He that
hath dangerously hurt another, may go under bail till the party is dead. But for this the
justice ought to be very cautious how he takes bail, till the year and day be past; for if the
party die, and the offender do[es] not appear, such justice is in danger of being severely
fined." Id.
84. See HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 175-78; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 478-81.
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abolished the authority of individual justices of the peace to bail felonies in
cases of "light suspicion." Whereas under Westminster admission to bail in
such cases fell within the discretion of the justice of the peace, afterwards
this discretion could only be exercised by two justices or in open session.85
As a result, individual justices were only able to bail minor crimes.8 6
These statutes, however, also proved ineffective as justices of the peace
continued to release many criminals not legally bailable, easily evaded the
two-signature requirement, and did not exercise the caution imposed by the
statute. 87 Further statutes were enacted to constrain these unauthorized
practices, making bail more difficult to attain.88
This new bail system was a vehicle of social justice, heralded for
combating the oppression that reigned previously. 89 Before Westminster's
enactment, malicious imprisonment and overly frequent granting of bail to
the wealthy threatened to undermine the legitimacy of the bail system. 90
The rigid definition of bailable offenses was a way to protect the public, as
well as the rights of the poor, by equalizing all defendants' access to bail. 91
While this statutory scheme strictly regulated the duties of coroners,
sheriffs, and justices of the peace, it prescribed no rule for the King's Bench
judges, who tried the accused 92 and whom the accused could petition for
bail if detained. 93 The Court of King's Bench maintained "absolute and
unlimited" discretion to accept bail "for any crime whatsoever," even high
treason, murder, or any other felony. 94 Blackstone reasons that to allow
85. See HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 176; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 488.
86. See HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 178; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 481.
87. See PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 480.
88. Id. at 480-81.
89. See, e.g., id. at 477; Buro, supra note 24, at 1411; Foote, supra note 39, at 966.
90. See HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at vii; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 477.
91. WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CASE OF ROBERT M. GOODWIN, ESQ. CHARGED WITH
KILLING JAMES STOUGHTON, ESQ. 30 (New York, Elam Bliss 1821) (including an opinion
from the Court of Sessions of New York that refers to the rule by which felons may only be
granted bail upon slight suspicion as "absolutely necessary to a due and impartial
administration of law; of that administration which shall put the poor and the rich on an
equal footing in a court of justice."); see also PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 477.
92. See Simpson v. Owens, 85 P.3d 478, 484 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing early
English common law); Ford v. Dilley, 156 N.W. 513, 521 (Iowa 1916) (remarking that the
legislature could not have intended to trust the decision to a county judge, thereby interfering
with the constitutional jurisdiction of the circuit court); BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at
*299; HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 178; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 483, 514 (citing
cases and treatises stating that the judges of the Court of King's Bench "may in their
discretion admit persons to bail in all cases whatever, although committed by justices of the
peace, or any other tribunal."); SAMPSON, supra note 91, at 188. According to Lord Coke,
justices of the peace had such limited authority to bail because "it were absurd to say, and
directly contrary to the Etymology of the Word," that someone other than the judge of that
person could admit him to bail. COKE, supra note 71, at 15.
93. See PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 485.
94. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *299; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 483; see
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903); Simpson, 85 P.3d at 484; HIGHMORE, supra note
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bail routinely for such enormous crimes would threaten public safety, but
that "there are cases, though they rarely happen, in which it would be hard
and unjust to confine a man in prison, though accused even of the greatest
offence." 95  He emphasizes the importance of preserving this judicial
discretion: "And herein the wisdom of the law is very manifest." 96
In practice, however, these judges generally acted in conformity with the
guidelines established by Westminster, paying "due regard to the rules
prescribed by it. ' ' 97 They applied the so-called Hawkins rule, named for the
case that held that for felony offenses, the strength of the evidence of guilt
should be the primary factor in bail decisions, but that the court may grant
bail anyway in special circumstances. 98 In addition to the veracity of the
accusation, the court also considered "the length of the imprisonment,...
the nature and tendency of the crime, [and] the dignity of the court, or
authority of the party by whom the prisoner was committed." 99 Despite
this discretion, in practice the court was usually deferential to the initial
decision to commit the prisoner.100
2. American Common Law
American courts picked up English bail law fairly seamlessly; they
similarly retain great discretion to grant bail in all cases, yet in practice
follow a standard based on the category of offense and strength of the
evidence. 101 The Supreme Court of New York, for example, compared its
authority to that of the Court of King's Bench 10 2 and exercised its
discretion to grant bail with similar restraint, choosing to follow the
Hawkins rule. 1 03 In general, no defendant could demand bail as of right for
23, at 178 ("This court may bail ... for treason, murder, or any crime whatsoever, if they see
good cause."); SAMPSON, supra note 91, at 188.
95. BLACKSTONE, supra note 29, at *299.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 93 P. 980, 981 (Okla. 1908); 1 MATTHEW BACON ET AL., A
NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 484 (London, A. Strahan 1832); PETERSDORFF, supra note
23, at 484; Davidson, supra note 64, at 1-2.
98. See, e.g., HIGHMORE, supra note 23, at 150; PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 484;
Davidson, supra note 64, at 2-3. It bears noting that, in Hawkins, the court cited rather
formal and definite processes, such as attainder and confession, as establishing the
presumption of guilt. Street v. State, 43 Miss. 1, 19 (1870).
99. PETERSDORFF, supra note 23, at 484.
100. See id. ("But they will seldom exercise this superintending jurisdiction, unless there
appear particular circumstances of ignorance, mistake, corruption, or irregularity, in the
commitment.").
101. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Baker, 177 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (Mass. 1961); State v.
Konigsberg, 164 A.2d 740, 742 (N.J. 1960); In re Thomas, 93 P. at 981; Fountaine v.
Mullen, 366 A.2d 1138, 1143 (R.I. 1976); 2 EDMUND HASTINGS BENNETT& FRANKLIN FISKE
HEARD, A SELECTION OF LEADING CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW 587-88 (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 1857).
102. BENNETr & HEARD, supra note 101, at 570.
103. SAMPSON, supra note 91, at 188; see BENNETT & HEARD, supra note 101, at 584-85.
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any felony charge but had to appeal to the court, which had the
discretionary power to grant or deny bail. 10 4 Murder generally was not
bailable. 10 5 While the likelihood of the accused's guilt and the category of
offense were the central factors in bail decisions, they served only as a
proxy for the risk of flight. 106
Beginning with Connecticut in 1818, some states began to offer greater
protection to defendants by guaranteeing a constitutional right to bail. 107
This right to bail developed to prevent an excessively prohibitive bail
system by placing the definition of certain offenses as nonbailable beyond
the authority of the legislature. 108
D. Bail Law Today: A State-by-State Analysis 10 9
1. State Constitutional Right-to-Bail Provisions
Nine state constitutions and Guam's Organic Act follow the U.S.
Constitution by only prohibiting excessive bail without including the right
to bail. 1 10 Forty-one state constitutions, Puerto Rico's constitution, and the
104. See, e.g., Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528, 531 (3d Cir. 1955); Fredette v. State, 428
A.2d 395, 401-02 (Me. 1981); Baker, 177 N.E.2d at 786; Street v. State, 43 Miss. 1, 20-21
(1870); BENNETT & HEARD, supra note 101, at 573; Leonard MacNally, Address to the Whig
Club of Ireland, with an Essay on Fiats 21-22 (1790) (discussing Lord Coke's position that
discretion be guided by legal rules).
105. See, e.g., Street, 43 Miss. at 29-31 (collecting other cases in which an indictment for
murder was found to be a conclusive basis for the denial of bail); Territory v. Benoit, 1 Mart.
(o.s.) 142, 142 (Orleans 1810) ("Bail is never allowed in offences punishable by death, when
the proof is evident or the presumption great.").
106. See, e.g., State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717, 718 (Fla. 1980) ("In capital cases [at
common law], 'bail was usually denied, on the theory that a defendant faced with the death
penalty would flee, no matter what promises or security were offered to secure his presence
at trial."') (quoting Arthur v. Harper, 371 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978));
SAMPSON, supra note 91, at 189 ("[l1f the punishment be death or corporal imprisonment, a
consciousness of guilt would probably induce to flight, and an evasion of the punishment;
and in admitting to bail, therefore, regard must be had to the probable guilt of the party, and
the nature of the punishment denounced.") (recounting the New York Supreme Court's
opinion in People v. Robert M Goodwin).
107. State v. Konigsberg, 164 A.2d 740, 742 (N.J. 1960).
108. See generally 8A AM. JUR. 2D Bail & Recognizance § 11 (2009) (describing the
colonial trend to limit by legislation the discretion of the trial court to deny bail, and
observing that that discretion to grant bail was a "necessary ingredient of the court's ability
to conduct judicial proceedings").
109. See infra Appendix (diagramming the following analysis in a table).
110. These states include the following: Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. In addition,
Guam's Organic Act contains no right to bail. 48 U.S.C. § 1421b (2006) (only prohibiting
excessive bail). The Hawaiian excessive bail clause goes even further than those of the other
states: "The court may dispense with bail if reasonably satisfied that the defendant or
witness will appear when directed, except for a defendant charged with an offense
punishable by life imprisonment." HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 12. While its constitution does not
expressly guarantee a right to bail, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that it does protect
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Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands additionally guarantee the right
to bail. I " '
Of these forty-three jurisdictions, thirty-five have preserved the
ambiguous language and basic grammatical structure at issue in this Note;
that is, they have preserved some variation of "shall be bailable ... except"
without providing further guidance. 112  Eight jurisdictions have
significantly modified the disputed language, either by expressly
prohibiting bail113 or by permitting its denial 114 in the excepted cases. By
providing further direction on how to handle the excepted cases, these
jurisdictions are excluded from this analysis. 115 Puerto Rico also falls
against arbitrary or unreasonable denial of bail, in addition to excessive bail. State v. Handa,
657 P.2d 464, 466-67 (Haw. 1983); Huihui v. Shimoda, 644 P.2d 968, 979 (Haw. 1982)
(reading this provision to clarify the discretionary powers of the court in bail decisions and,
accordingly, striking down a statute that required the denial of bail in certain cases).
111. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11; ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22; ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19; CONN. CONST. art. I, §
8; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 12; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 6; ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 9; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 17; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, § 9; KY.
CONST. § 16; LA. CONST. art. I, § 18; ME. CONST. art. I, § 10; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15;
MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 7; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 29; MO. CONST. art. I, § 20; MONT. CONST.
art. II, § 21; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 7; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11; N.M.
CONST. art. 1I, § 13; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9; OKLA. CONST. art. II, §
8; OR. CONST. art. I, § 14; PA. CONST. art. I, § 14; P.R. CONST. art. II, § 11; R.I. CONST. art. I,
§ 9; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 11; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8: VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 40; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20; Wis.
CONST. art. I, § 8; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14; Revised Organic Act of 1954, 48 U.S.C. § 1561
(2006); see also Petition of Humphrey, 601 P.2d 103, 105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979)
(counting thirty-five states with similar constitutional right-to-bail provisions); 8A AM. JUR.
2D Bail and Recognizance § 11 (2009). Before 1838, Maine's constitution contained an
express right-to-bail provision: "All persons, before conviction, shall be bailable, except for
capital offences, where the proof is evident or the presumption great." Fredette v. State, 428
A.2d 395, 402 (Me. 1981). The people then amended it to read, "No person before
conviction shall be bailable for [capital offenses] when the proof is evident or the
presumption great .... " Id. While the provision no longer expressly confers the right to
bail, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that the new language carries the same
guarantee as before. Id.
112. See infra notes 117, 118, 121, 122 and accompanying text.
113. IND. CONST. art. I, § 17 (specifying that murder and treason "shall not be bailable,
when the proof is evident, or the presumption strong"); ME. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No person
. . . shall be bailable for any . . . capital offenses . . . when the proof is evident or the
presumption great .... "); OR. CONST. art. I, § 14 (stating that murder and treason "shall not
be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the presumption strong"). Despite the strongly and
uniquely prohibitive language found in its constitution, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
still held that the decision to grant bail remains discretionary. See infra Part II.A.4.
114. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 15 ("[E]xcept that bail may be denied for the following
persons when the proof is evident or the presumption great .... "); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 8;
S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 15; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The legislature may by law authorize, but
may not require, circuit courts to deny release .... "); see supra note 52 (discussing whether
"may" is permissive).
115. Several states also specify that certain offenses "shall not be bailable" or that bail
"may be denied" when the proof is evident or the presumption great, upon a further finding
that the accused is dangerous or a flight risk. Although the requirement of this further
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outside the scope of this analysis because its constitutional right to bail is
absolute for all offenses. 116
Of the thirty-five remaining jurisdictions, seventeen have left the
traditional language intact 117 or varied it only slightly in order to modernize
the language. 118 Of these seventeen jurisdictions that only exclude capital
offenses from their constitutional right to bail, Alaska, Iowa, Minnesota,
New Jersey, and North Dakota have since abolished the death penalty. 1 9
Supreme courts in three of these five states have held that all offenses are
now bailable under the constitution, 120 making the present inquiry moot
finding presents other questions, discussed in Part I.D.4, these states' provisions are still
relevant to this analysis to the extent that they preserve the disputed language ("shall be
bailable . . . unless") for some offenses. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (providing that any
defendant may be detained if necessary to assure public safety, presence at trial, or the
integrity of the judicial process); LA. CONST. art. I, § 18(B) (providing that certain offenses
when "the proof is evident and the presumption of guilt is great, shall not be bailable" if the
judge finds that the accused may pose a flight risk or imminent danger, but preserving the
original language for capital offenses); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 29; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 20,
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13. Similarly, while Texas's right to bail preserves the original
language with respect to capital offenses, its constitution deviates by providing that specified
noncapital defendants "may be denied" bail upon evidence "substantially showing" their
guilt. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 1 la. As a result, only the former section is within the scope
of this analysis.
116. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 11 ("Before conviction every accused shall be entitled to be
admitted to bail.").
117. That is, these provisions preserve the basic wording that "all persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, unless [or except] for capital offenses when the proof is
evident or the presumption great." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; DEL.
CONST. art. I, § 12; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12; KAN. CONST. Bill of
Rights, § 9; KY. CONST. § 16; MrNN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 21; N.J.
CONST. art. I, § 11; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. I, §
15; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 20; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14.
118. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 11 ("[E]ntitled ... to be released ... except .... "); CONN.
CONST. art. I, § 8 ("[S]hall have a right.., to be released.., except ... ").
119. Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389, 1394 n.17 (Alaska 1974); State v. Pett, 92 N.W.2d
205, 206 (Minn. 1958); see generally Amnesty International USA, Death Penalty in States,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/death-penalty/death-penalty-in-states/page.do?id= 1101153 (last
visited Sept. 21, 2009) (listing states that have abolished capital punishment).
120. Martin, 517 P.2d at 1394 n.17; Pett, 92 N.W.2d at 208; see State v. Johnson, 294
A.2d 245, 249 (N.J. 1972). Before abolition of the death penalty, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the right to bail only excluded treason, because murder was no longer
punishable by death. Johnson, 294 A.2d at 249. Presumably, since the death penalty has
been abolished entirely, all offenses are now bailable as of right. The Supreme Court of
South Dakota had also ruled that the abolition of the death penalty made the right to bail
absolute, but then reenacted the death penalty in 1979. See Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 204
N.W. 999, 1001 (S.D. 1925); Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Database,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state by state (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). The Iowa and
North Dakota courts have not had occasion to decide whether the right to bail is now
absolute. State v. Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d 475, 477 (Iowa 1978) (declining to address this
question because decided on other grounds); State v. Fowler, 248 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Iowa
1976); State v. Stevens, 234 N.W.2d 623, 625 n.1 (N.D. 1975). If, like New Jersey, they
define capital offenses as those offenses currently punishable by death, all offenses probably
would be bailable as of right (known as the "penalty theory"). See, e.g., People ex rel.
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unless the provisions are amended, and leaving thirty-two jurisdictions in
which this question is still relevant.
Ten of these thirty-two jurisdictions have expanded the category of
excepted offenses beyond capital offenses, to also include first-degree
murder, offenses punishable by life imprisonment, and/or other serious
felonies, when the proof is evident or presumption great. 121 Seven also
include a public-safety or flight-risk exception for some or all offenses
within the structure of the disputed language. 122  Their constitutions
exclude certain felonies from the guarantee when the proof is evident or
presumption great, but only upon a further finding that no condition or set
of conditions can ensure the accused's presence at trial or the safety of the
community.
2. Corresponding Penal Statutes and Court Rules
The present issue centers on how much room these constitutional right-
to-bail provisions leave for legislative and judicial discretion in the
excepted cases. If the legislature prohibits bail anyway, this question is
moot. Whether this act is an exercise of legislative discretion or
constitutionally mandated is largely academic and unlikely to be
adjudicated. 123  A potential conflict may arise if the statute expressly
provides a different standard for bail that may authorize release even if the
proof is evident 124 or if the statute is silent, ambiguous, or identical to the
Hemingway v. Elrod, 322 N.E.2d 837, 839-40 (Ill. 1975). If they define capital offenses as
those offenses that received the death penalty at the time the right to bail was ratified, certain
offenses may still fall within the exception (known as the "classification theory"). See, e.g.,
Exparte Bynum, 312 So. 2d 52, 55 (Ala. 1975); Roll v. Larson, 516 P.2d 1392, 1393 (Utah
1973).
121. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22 (also exempting, inter alia, capital offenses and sexual
assault); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (life imprisonment); ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (life
imprisonment); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9 (murder, treason, and certain sexual offenses); NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 7 (life imprisonment); PA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (life imprisonment); R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 9 (life imprisonment, weapons offense with prior conviction, and controlled
substance offenses); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (arrests while on probation); VT. CONST. ch. 2, §
40 (life imprisonment); Revised Organic Act, 48 U.S.C. § 1561 (2006) (first-degree murder).
122. AIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22 (public safety exception for felony offenses); CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 12 (public safety exception for sexual assault and violent felonies); COLO. CONST.
art. 11, § 19 (public safety exception for violent felony committed while on probation); ILL.
CONST. art. 1, § 9 (public safety exception for felonies); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9 (public safety
exception for all felonies); PA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (public safety exception for all felonies);
UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8 (public safety and flight exception for any felony charge designated
by statute and supported by substantial evidence).
123. See Tijerina v. Baker, 438 P.2d 514, 518 (N.M. 1968) (declining to decide on
constitutional grounds whether the trial court could bail a defendant in the excepted cases
because the statute prohibited bail anyway).
124. For example, the Virgin Islands statute struck down in Browne v. People, No. 2008-
022, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33 (Aug. 29, 2008), discussed in the Introduction, provided
a standard based on the safety of the community and the defendant's appearance at trial. In
addition to the weight of the evidence, it listed other factors for the court to consider, such as
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constitutional language, creating an opportunity for the judiciary to apply a
different standard.
Of the thirty-two relevant jurisdictions, ten have penal statutes that
expressly 125 or implicitly 12 6 prohibit bail in the excepted cases, making this
issue moot unless the legislature amends the statute.
A potential conflict, therefore, may arise in the twenty-two remaining
jurisdictions. The penal statutes of six of these jurisdictions provide a
standard other than merely the strength of the evidence, possibly permitting
bail in the excepted cases and creating a direct conflict with the
constitutional provision if the latter is read to be prohibitive. 127  The
the person's "past and present conduct, . . . family ties, employment, financial resources,
character and mental condition, length of residence in the community, [and] record of
convictions .... V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 3504a(a)(1) (1997); see infra Part II.B.4.
125. ALA. CODE § 15-13-3(a) (1995) ("A defendant cannot be admitted to bail when he is
charged with an offense which may be punished by death [if the proof is evident or the
presumption great.]"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3961(A) (2001) ("A person in custody
shall not be admitted to bail if the proof is evident or the presumption great that he is guilty
of the offense and the offense charged is [one of the offenses specified in the constitutional
provision]."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.5 (West 2004) ("A defendant charged with an
offense punishable with death cannot be admitted to bail, when the proof of his or her guilt is
evident or the presumption thereof great."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2103 (2007) ("A
capital crime shall not be bailable .... The Superior Court may admit to bail a person
charged with a capital crime if, after full inquiry ... there is good ground to doubt the truth
of the accusation .... ); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2903 (2004) ("A defendant charged with an
offense punishable with death can not be admitted to bail, when the proof of his guilt is
evident or the presumption thereof great."); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-4 (2006),
invalidated in part by People v. Purcell, 758 N.E.2d 895 (II1. App. Ct. 2001) (while
subsection (a) is practically identical to the constitutional provision, (b) provides, "A person
seeking release on bail who is charged with a capital offense or [life imprisonment] shall not
be bailable until a hearing is held wherein such person has the burden of demonstrating that
the proof of his guilt is not evident and the presumption is not great."); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 331 (2003) ("A person charged with the commission of a capital offense
shall not be admitted to bail if the proof is evident and the presumption great that he is guilty
of the capital offense.").
126. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2716 (2007) ("Unless the offense with which the prisoner is
charged is shown to be an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment ... a judge...
may admit the person arrested to bail .... "); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-506 (1995) ("[If] it shall
appear that an offense has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that the
person charged has committed the offense, the accused shall be committed to the jail . . . to
remain until he is discharged by due course of law; Provided, if the offense be bailable, the
accused may be [conditionally] released .... ); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.484(4) (2006) ("A
person arrested for murder of the first degree may be admitted to bail unless the proof is
evident or the presumption great .... giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature
and circumstances of the offense.").
127. IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.1 (West 2003) ("All defendants are bailable both before and
after conviction, by sufficient surety, or subject to [conditional] release .... "); N.D. R.
CRIM. P. 46 (providing for conditional release based on flight risk rather than the offense
charged); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-5.1 (2002) (providing for a rebuttable presumption of
danger once the proof is evident or presumption great, leaving the court discretion to grant
bail if rebutted, despite evident proof); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-43-2.1 (1998) (providing
for conditional release of a defendant charged with a capital offense, unless no conditions of
release can assure his appearance at trial and the safety of the community); WASH. R. CRIM.
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statutes of sixteen jurisdictions provide no more information than their
respective constitutional provisions concerning bail for the excepted
offenses, either because they are identical to the corresponding
constitutional provision, 128 silent as to which offenses are bailable,' 29 or
otherwise ambiguous. 130
3. The Case Law
As the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated, the "case law on
this subject is extremely meager." 131  Fifteen jurisdictions have directly
addressed the present question at some point, either in a holding or in clear
dicta. Eleven read the constitutional provision as silent, leaving the
P. 3.2(g) ("Any person charged with a capital offense shall not be released in accordance
with this rule unless the court finds that release on conditions will reasonably assure that the
accused will appear for later hearings, will not significantly interfere with the administration
of justice and will not pose a substantial danger to another or the community."); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 5, § 3504a(a)(1) (1997), invalidated in part by Browne, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS
33 (providing for conditional release of persons charged with first-degree murder unless no
set of conditions can reasonably assure the safety of the community or person's presence at
trial, even though the Revised Organic Act's guarantee expressly excludes first-degree
murder). Because the Iowa and North Dakota courts have not confronted this issue since
abolishing the death penalty, their permissive penal statutes may simply reflect an
understanding that the right to bail is now absolute, or may create a conflict if, for the
purposes of the bail statute, the court interprets capital offenses to include offenses that used
to be punishable by death. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-101 (2008) (practically identical); FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.131; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 4.04 (practically identical); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-102 (2007)
(practically identical); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5701 (West 2004) (identical regarding
capital offenses and silent as to all other excepted cases); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-102
(2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-20-1 (2003) (practically identical); WYo. R. CRIM. P. 46.1.
The Pennsylvania General Assembly is now considering a bill that would amend the penal
statute to be identical to the constitutional provision. S.B. 256, 119th Gen. Assem. (Pa.
2007).
129. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-84-116(a) (2005) ("The court... may [detain the defendant
and revoke bail] . . .(3) Upon an indictment's being found for an offense not bailable.");
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.676 (West 2002) (does not provide specifically for capital offenses);
N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-401 ("[A]ny person bailable under [the constitution] shall be ordered
released pending trial [on recognizance or bond].").
130. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-53 (West 2009) ("Each person detained ... for an
offense not punishable by death shall be entitled to bail and shall be released ...."); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-5-35 (2006) (providing only that "[any person having been twice tried on
an indictment charging a capital offense, wherein each trial has resulted in a failure of the
jury to agree upon his guilt or innocence, shall be entitled to bail"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
2937.222 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing for a bail hearing in case of noncapital felonies, to
determine whether the proof is evident and the defendant poses a danger, but silent regarding
capital offenses, for which the constitution only specifies that the proof be evident); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 17.151, 17.21 (Vernon 2005) (providing for release in "a
bailable case," and providing generally for release of any offense upon excessive delay); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7553 (1998) ("A person charged with an offense punishable by life
imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is great may be held without bail. If the evidence
of guilt is not great, the person shall be bailable .... ).
131. Commonwealth v. Baker, 177 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Mass. 1961).
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decision to the discretion of the legislature and judiciary, 132 and four
interpreted it to prohibit bail in the excepted cases. 133 Of the twenty-two
jurisdictions in which this conflict is currently relevant,134 nine are among
those whose courts have settled the issue or addressed the conflict in
dicta. 135 Therefore, there are thirteen jurisdictions in which the present
question is relevant yet still undecided by the courts. 136
Although only a minority of jurisdictions has directly addressed this
conflict, a cursory glance at the case law reveals many more decisions that
may mislead a reader into thinking that the court has taken a decisive
position.' 37  As discussed in the Introduction, courts rarely question
whether they have discretion to grant bail to defendants charged with
capital or other serious felonies once they have found that the proof is
evident. 138 Judicial practice supports the denial of bail anyway, so courts
often have no reason to consider whether the constitution mandates this
detention. More often, when courts examine the constitutional right to bail,
they consider intersecting issues, such as the quantum of proof needed to
satisfy the proof-evident standard, 139 or whether the right to bail, when
conferred, is absolute. 140 Because the topics overlap, emphatic language
defining the cases in which bail is not guaranteed can be misread to suggest
that bail is additionally prohibited in these cases. 141
132. See infra Part II.A.
133. See infra Part II.B.
134. Some jurisdictions may have decided this issue in the past, but since amended their
constitutions or revised their statutes, removing the matter from judicial determination. For
example, California courts have held that the constitutional provision is discretionary, but
the issue is no longer relevant because the penal statute expressly prohibits bail in the
excepted cases. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270.5 (West 2004); People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539,
542 (1862).
135. These jurisdictions are Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and the Virgin Islands. See infra Part I1.B.2, II.A.3,
II.A.5, II.B.3, II.A.7, II.A.9-11, II.B.4.
136. The remaining jurisdictions are the following: Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa,
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming.
137. See, e.g., State v. Larsen, 415 P.2d 685, 693 (Idaho 1966) ("[T]he Idaho constitution
explicitly excludes the right to bail in capital offenses."); People v. St. Lucia, 146 N.E. 183,
187 (I1. 1924).
138. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47, 51 (Alaska 1971).
140. In order to emphasize that bail is guaranteed in noncapital cases, courts often use
language that only seems to further imply that capital defendants are ineligible for bail when
proof is evident. See, e.g., Brooks v. Gaw, 346 S.W.2d 543, 543 (Ky. 1961); State v.
Konigsberg, 164 A.2d 740, 742 (N.J. 1960) ("[A] person accused of a capital offense is
entitled to bail unless the proof is evident or the presumption great .... "); Tijerina v. Baker,
438 P.2d 514, 517 (N.M. 1968) ("[One accused of a capital crime] is not entitled to bail until
that presumption [that the proof is evident] is overcome.").
141. In other cases, the court may speak clearly about its discretion to grant bail to capital
defendants but, upon further examination, this "discretion" actually refers to the decision of
whether the proof is evident or the presumption great. That is, the court may decide whether
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4. The Recent Amendments
In the past thirty years, several states have amended their right-to-bail
provisions to expressly incorporate another standard in addition to whether
the proof is evident. 14 2 Within the structure of the disputed language, these
amended provisions permit (or mandate, depending on the jurisdiction) the
denial of bail for certain offenses only upon a further finding that no
condition or set of conditions can reasonably ensure the defendant's
presence at trial or the safety of the community. 14 3  Because these
amendments usually layer the flight or harm exception over the proof-
evident standard, they create a complicated right-to-bail provision. Most of
the case law that considers this issue addresses simpler provisions. 144 As a
result, the courts have not had the opportunity to consider the impact of
these amendments on the present question.
II. RIGHT TO BAIL OR WRONG TO BAIL?
Part II begins by dividing the jurisdictions that have directly addressed
this obscure conflict into two categories: (A) those that have actively
considered the issue, whether in holding or in dicta, and interpreted the
constitutional provision to permit bail in the excepted cases at the discretion
of the legislature or court; and (B) those that have actively considered the
issue but held or stated clearly in dicta that the constitution prohibits bail in
the excepted cases. Part II.C then discusses a common problem throughout
the case law: a third category of opinions in which the court seems to
presume that bail is either discretionary or prohibited, without considering
the alternative interpretation. Finally, Part I1.D examines the implications
of the recent constitutional amendments for this conflict.
A. Jurisdictions That Adopt the Discretionary Interpretation
1. Alabama
In one of the earliest cases on the subject, Ex parte Croom,14 5 the
Supreme Court of Alabama held that the constitutional right-to-bail
provision did not preempt a statute that granted bail to any capital defendant
the proof is evident, and the indictment alone does not compel that decision. See, e.g., In re
Wheeler, 406 P.2d 713, 715-16 (Nev. 1965). Use of this language does not signify that the
court has decided it retains discretion to grant bail, even if the proof is evident or the
presumption great.
142. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
144. See infra Part II.A-B.
145. 19 Ala. 561 (1851).
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whose trial had been delayed for certain reasons. 146 The court reasoned
that the provision was not intended to deny the legislature the power to
provide for bail in the excepted cases; rather, its purpose was to prevent the
legislature from prohibiting bail outright in certain cases, as occurred
previously.147 The constitutional provision affected only those individuals
to whom it extended the right to bail. That is, it guaranteed all noncapital
defendants and capital defendants for whom the proof is not evident and
presumption not great, a right to bail they did not enjoy at common law. 148
The constitutional provision was silent, however, as to the excepted cases-
capital defendants for whom the proof is evident or the presumption great-
leaving their situation at common law unchanged. Therefore, the court
concluded, for this category there was no restriction on the legislature to
permit or prohibit bail. 149
As further evidence, the court noted that the same legislature that
included this provision in the bill of rights just days later also provided for
bail in all cases of treason or felony in which excessive trial delays not
caused by the accused occurred. 150 The court explained that it "would
seem somewhat paradoxical to hold, that in a bill of rights, the convention
should have put the negative of a common law right beyond the power of
legislative control, however much necessity might exist for legislative
action." 151
2. California
In People v. Tinder, 152 the Supreme Court of California declared that the
"admission to bail in capital cases, where the proof is evident or the
presumption is great, may be made a matter of discretion, and may be
forbidden by legislation, but in no other cases." 153 The statute in that case
made bail discretionary in capital cases generally but prohibited bail in
capital cases when the proof is evident or presumption great. 154 The court
struck down the former clause as unconstitutional because it made bail
discretionary in all capital cases, including those in which the proof is not
146. Id. at 570.
147. Id.; see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
148. See Croom, 19 Ala. at 572 (noting that the statute, in providing for bail in cases of
delay, must be referring only to capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption
great, since in all other cases the constitution guarantees the right to bail).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 571.
151. Id.; see also Fredette v. State, 428 A.2d 395, 404 (Me. 1981) (reading implicit right
to bail into amended constitutional provision because "it seems anomalous that the negation
of such right of the individual as against the government would be retained as a part of a
constitutional 'Declaration of Rights'").
152. 19 Cal. 539 (1862).
153. Id. at 542.
154. Id. at 542-43.
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evident and bail should be guaranteed as of right. The court upheld the
latter clause as the proper exercise of the legislature's discretion to prohibit
bail in capital cases when the proof is evident. 155
After holding that the indictment creates a presumption of guilt for all
purposes except the trial, the court noted that, independently of the strength
of the prosecution's case, there may be circumstances that justify bail after
indictment for a capital offense. 156 Even if the proof is evident, the court
may allow bail in special cases, including unreasonable delay or repeal of
the law defining the offense, 157 qualifying the statute's clear prohibition
against bail.
In 1993, 131 years later, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its
earlier holding without actually citing Tinder or any other case. People v.
Superior Court158 clarified the relationship between the constitutional
provision and the penal statute, which in this case prohibited bail, by
distinguishing the purposes of the two provisions. The court explained that
the constitution guarantees the right to bail to all defendants except those
charged with capital offenses when the facts are evident, whereas the penal
statute prohibits the setting of bail in such cases. 159 As in Tinder, the court
upheld the statute as the proper exercise of the legislature's discretion to
prohibit bail. 160
3. Florida
In State v. Arthur,161 the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that,
while several jurisdictions have construed their constitutional provisions to
prohibit bail in the cases excepted from the guarantee, 162 more have
interpreted theirs to allow courts the discretion to grant release on bail even
in those excepted cases. 163 The court chose to join the latter group 164 and
affirmed the appellate court's holding that the court still has discretion to
grant or deny bail in a capital case, even if the proof is evident. 165
155. Id. at 542.
156. Id. at 549-50.
157. Id.
158. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 38 (Ct. App. 1993).
159. Id. at 40.
160. Id. at 40-42.
161. 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 1980).
162. Id. at 718 & n.2 (citing State v. Garrett, 493 P.2d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972);
People v. District Court, 529 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1974) (en banc)). Garrett and District Court
are discussed in Part II.B. I and Part II.B.2, respectively.
163. Id. at 718 & n.3 (citing State v. Hartzell, 100 N.W. 745 (N.D. 1904); Ex parte
Howell, 245 P. 66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926); Fountaine v. Mullen, 366 A.2d 1138 (R.I.
1976); State v. Toomey, 223 A.2d 473 (Vt. 1966)). Hartzell, Howell, Fountaine, and
Toomey are discussed in Part II.A.7, Part II.A.8, Part II.A.9, Part II.A.1 1, respectively.
164. Arthur, 390 So. 2d at 719.
165. Id. at 718-19.
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The court first reasoned that the plain language of the constitution seems
to compel this interpretation. 166  It went on to analyze the historical
background to the constitutional right-to-bail provision. 167 At common
law, it explained, the court had discretion to grant bail in all cases, but the
accused had no right to bail in any case. 168 In capital cases, the court
usually denied bail because of the great risk of flight in order to save one's
life, but retained discretion to grant bail if satisfied by the defendant's
assurances. 169 When the states decided to guarantee bail in certain cases,
they included an exception for capital cases, but only when the proof is
evident or the presumption great. 170 Since the constitutional provision
purported to grant additional rights not recognized at common law, the
courts should not interpret it as limiting or removing the capital defendant's
opportunity for release on reasonable conditions. 17 1  Finally, the court
concluded that the state's interest in ensuring the accused's presence at trial
"does not so outweigh [his] interest in retaining his liberty as to justify
denying completely the opportunity to convince the court that release on
bail is appropriate." 72
4. Maine
In Harnish v. State,173 the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine stated that
the right to bail does not affect the discretionary power of the court to grant
bail in any case, including capital cases when the proof is evident. 174
Harnish defined the procedures owed to the defendant at the bail hearing,
equating the "proof evident" standard to that of probable cause. 175 The
court continued that a finding of probable cause, while extinguishing the
right to bail, leaves the court's discretionary power to grant bail intact. 176 It
further stated that this discretionary power to admit any defendant to bail is
"beyond the scope" of the constitutional right to bail and, therefore,
unaffected. 17 7
166. Id. (finding that the plain language does not support the state's argument that denial
of bail is mandatory because of the high risk that a capital defendant will flee when the proof
of guilt is evident).




171. Id. at 718-19.
172. Id. at 719.
173. 531 A.2d 1264 (Me. 1987).
174. Id. at 1269.
175. Id. at 1268.
176. Id. at 1269.




While the case law in Mississippi is inconsistent on this issue, its clearest
holding has been that the decision to grant bail remains a matter of
discretion in the excepted cases.178 In Ex parte Wray,179 the Mississippi
Supreme Court stated in dicta that after finding that the proof is evident in a
capital case "a court might, in the exercise of a sound discretion admit a
party to bail, [although] he could not certainly claim it as a right." 180
Just fourteen years later, the Mississippi Supreme Court cited Wray for
its holding that the indictment alone does not establish evident proof but,
after a long description of the common law, endorsed the view that bail
should be denied for a capital offense when the proof is evident. 181 In
accordance with custom at common law, the court read its constitution to
permit bail in the excepted cases only if induced by "some special motive,"
such as delay or illness, and ultimately affirmed the lower court's denial of
bail. 182
6. Nevada
In In re Wheeler,18 3 the Supreme Court of Nevada began its analysis by
noting that the language of the constitutional provision generally favors bail
and comports with the presumption of innocence, by disfavoring
punishment before conviction. 184 The court explained that, for this reason,
all offenses are bailable. 18 5 While the right to bail is otherwise absolute, in
capital cases it is subject to the limitation of "when the proof is evident, or
the presumption great." 186  Within this "area of limitation a court is
invested with a judicial discretion to resolve the matter."18 7 The court then
cited cases indicating that this 'discretion' actually applies to the decision
178. See Exparte Wray, 30 Miss. 673 (1856); see also Huff v. Edwards, 241 So. 2d 654,
656 (Miss. 1970) (quoting Ex parte Bridewell, 57 Miss. 39 (1879)) (holding that bail
remains discretionary, but arguably limiting this discretion to "extraordinary circumstances"
such as serious health problems or excessive trial delay). Contra Street v. State, 43 Miss. 1,
25-26 (1870).
179. 30 Miss. 673.
180. Id. at 679.
181. Street, 43 Miss. at 26-28.
182. Id. at23,31.
183. 406 P.2d 713 (Nev. 1965).
184. Id. at 715.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 715-16 (noting that its "view of the constitutional emphasis" may conflict with




of whether the proof is evident, not the decision of whether to grant bail
when the proof is evident. 188
In Wheeler, the legislature forbade bail in the excepted cases. 189 Despite
the particularly strong statutory language prohibiting bail, the court held
that the finding that the proof is evident is not necessarily dispositive. 190
Once the court makes that determination, it may also consider other
information unrelated to the accused's guilt but related to the main purpose
of bail-ensuring the accused's presence at trial. 191 Therefore, even in
light of a clear statutory prohibition, the court retains some discretion to
consider information beyond the weight of the proof of guilt and,
presumably, to grant bail when appropriate. Ultimately, however, the
defendant did not convince the court to reverse the order denying bail. 192
7. North Dakota
In re West 193 held that the constitutional bail provision does not forbid
bail in the excepted cases. 194 Rather, the Supreme Court of North Dakota
read the provision to be "silent as to granting or withholding bail in a
capital case where the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption thereof is
great." 195 Although the provision does not grant the right to bail to this
category of defendants, it does not prohibit the legislature from doing so. 196
The court cited Tinder197 as support. 198 Ultimately, however, it declined to
grant bail because the accused had not presented any special facts or
circumstances that appealed to the court's discretion. 199
Three years later, the North Dakota Supreme Court reiterated its earlier
holding that bail is a matter of discretion in capital cases when the proof is
evident or the presumption great.200
188. Id. at 716 (citing cases in support of the proposition that indictment alone does not
decide question of evident proof, leaving room for a further judicial determination).
189. The legislature had expressly provided, "No person shall be admitted to bail where
he is charged with an offense punishable with death when the proof is evident or the
presumption great ....I d. at 715.
190. Id. at 716.
191. The court listed the accused's community associations, employment opportunities,
and any prior criminal record and attempted escapes as examples. Id.
192. Id. at 717.
193. 88 N.W. 88 (N.D. 1901).
194. Id. at 89.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
198. In re West, 88 N.W. at 89.
199. Id. at 90.
200. State v. Hartzell, 100 N.W. 745, 746 (N.D. 1904) (ultimately denying the application
for bail after finding that the proof was evident because the defendant did not convince the




In 1926, the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma remarked in dicta
that it is "the uniform holding of this court" that the granting or denial of
bail in capital cases when the proof is evident or presumption great is "a
matter of judicial discretion." 201 It cited no cases, however, and ultimately
held that bail was a matter of right anyway because the proof was not
evident. 20 2 The court did not mention earlier opinions that seemed to take
for granted that bail would be refused upon a finding that the proof was
evident or presumption great. 203  These opinions did not discuss the
existence of any further discretionary power to grant bail, reflecting the
practice that prevailed at common law.
9. Rhode Island
In Fountaine v. Mullen,204 after holding that the lower court did not err
in finding that the proof of guilt of first-degree murder was evident, 20 5 the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island remanded the case for a hearing to decide
whether bail should be granted as a matter of discretion. 20 6 The court noted
that Arizona courts have expressly held that bail is prohibited in such
cases, 20 7 while other courts have said so in dicta, without explanation or
support.208 The court then noted that at least Vermont and North Dakota
have expressly held that bail may still be granted as a matter of discretion in
the excepted cases. 209
The court ultimately found the latter interpretation to be more persuasive,
based on the history of these bail provisions. 210 At common law, the court
201. Exparte Howell, 245 P. 66, 66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1926); see also Exparte Womack,
71 P.2d 494, 495 (Okla. Crim. App. 1937) (observing that "it is generally held" that the
constitutional provision preserves the discretion enjoyed by the judiciary at common law).
202. Howell, 245 P. at 66.
203. Ex parte Harkins, 124 P. 931, 938 (Okla. Crim. App. 1912) (noting that bail "should
be refused" and "must be refused" in the excepted cases). But see In re Thomas, 93 P. 980,
982-83 (Okla. 1908) (noting that, while bail "should" and "must be refused" in capital cases
when the proof is evident, it is still within sound judicial discretion to grant bail under
extraordinary circumstances, such as delay or illness).
204. 366 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 1976).
205. Id. at 1142.
206. Id. at 1144.
207. Id. at 1143 (citing State v. Garrett, 493 P.2d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972)). For a
discussion of Garrett, see infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
208. Id. (citing State ex rel. Murray v. Dist. Court, 90 P. 513 (Mont. 1907)); see infra
note 255 & accompanying text (citing State ex rel. Murray v. District Court for the
proposition that some opinions suggest that in the excepted cases bail must be denied).
209. Fountaine, 366 A.2d at 1143 (citing State v. Hartzell, 100 N.W. 745 (N.D. 1904); Ex
parte Dexter, 107 A. 134, 138 (Vt. 1919)). For a discussion of Exparte Dexter and Hartzell,
see infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text and supra note 200 and accompanying text,
respectively.
210. Fountaine, 366 A.2d at 1143; see also State v. Currington, 700 P.2d 942, 944 (Idaho
1985) (noting that the fixing of bail is a matter traditionally left to the judiciary); Witt v.
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retained the inherent authority to grant or deny bail in its discretion. 21' The
court opined that the people included liberal bail provisions in their state
constitutions "because judges exercised their discretion adversely to the
accused so frequently." 212  The court concluded that, against this
background, the constitutional bail provision was intended to expand the
bail rights enjoyed at common law. 213 It added that "it would be highly
dubious to treat a provision that was enacted as a guarantee of rights in such
a way as to retract rights previously enjoyed by defendants, absent clear
evidence that the framers intended that result. '214
10. South Dakota
Before the statewide abolition of the death penalty made bail "a matter of
absolute right in all cases," 215 the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that
admission to bail for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great is discretionary. 216 The court, quoting Tinder,217 held
that the legislature may permit or forbid bail in the excepted cases. 218 It
went on to validate a statute that did the latter, but ultimately granted the
defendant bail because the proof was not evident. 219
11. Vermont
In 1919, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the court retains
discretion to admit the accused to bail, even when the offense charged is
capital and the proof is evident or presumption great.220 Exparte Dexter221
reasoned that at "common law a person accused or indicted of any felony
whatsoever was bailable in the discretion of the court, upon good sureties,
until he was convicted. ' 222 Against this historical background, the court
continued, it is more reasonable to interpret the constitutional provision to
Moran, 572 A.2d 261, 266 (R.I. 1990) (basing its holding that bail and detention are "within
the judicial sphere of government and cannot be entirely delegated to the Legislature" on
separation of powers principles); Demmith v. Wis. Judicial Conference, 480 N.W.2d 502,
509 (Wis. 1992) ("Because bail is an area of shared powers, the legislature may set forth
standards ... as long as [it] does not infringe on the judiciary's power.").
211. Fountaine, 366 A.2d at 1143.
212. Id. (quoting State v. Konigsberg, 164 A.2d 740, 742 (N.J. 1960)).
213. Id. at 1144.
214. Id.
215. Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 204 N.W. 999, 1001 (S.D. 1925).
216. State v. Kauffman, 108 N.W. 246, 246 (S.D. 1906).
217. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
218. Kauffman, 108 N.W. at 246.
219. The court struck down a provision of the statute that made bail discretionary in
capital offenses regardless of whether the proof is evident. If the proof is not evident, bail is
a matter of right even for capital offenses. Id at 246-47.
220. Exparte Dexter, 107 A. 134, 138 (Vt. 1919).
221. 107 A. 134.
222. Id. at 138.
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preserve this discretion in the cases excluded from the bail guarantee, rather
than to limit implicitly the protections available at common law. 223 The
court is not, however, free to make arbitrary decisions; rather, "certain and
well defined and established rules" must control and contain this
discretion. 224 Accordingly, courts ordinarily deny bail in the excepted
cases, absent special circumstances.
In Dexter, the reviewing court admitted the defendant to bail because the
lower court had ruled against her as a matter of law, and she was entitled to
the benefit of judicial discretion.225  The Vermont Supreme Court
rearticulated this holding in 1966.226
B. Jurisdictions That Adopt the Prohibitive Interpretation
1. Arizona
In State v. Garrett,227 the Court of Appeals of Arizona reversed the trial
court's grant of bail despite evident proof of guilt, holding that the
constitution mandates denial of bail in the excepted cases. 228 For this
proposition, however, it cited no authority, supporting this conclusion only
by the relevant provision's purposes. 229  The people amended the
constitution to expand the exceptions from the bail guarantee in order to
prevent abuses of the bail system by arrestees who commit additional
crimes while released on bail. 230 The court reasoned that, in this context, to
read the constitutional language as merely directive would subvert the
provision's purposes, reverting to the looser bail conditions that existed
223. The court employed the principle of statutory interpretation that "rules of the
common law are not to be changed by doubtful implications, nor overturned except by clear
and unambiguous language." Id. at 136 (citing State v. Shaw, 50 A. 863 (Vt. 1901)).
224. Id. at 138.
225. Id.
226. State v. Toomey, 223 A.2d 473 (Vt. 1966). The court also listed several factors to
consider in determining the amount of bail: the ability of the accused to give bail; nature of
the offense, penalty for the offense charged; character and reputation of the accused; health
of the accused; character and strength of the evidence; probability of the accused appearing
at trial; forfeiture of other bonds; and whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested. Id. at 475; see also State v. Blackmer, 631 A.2d 1134, 1138-39 (Vt. 1993) (holding
that the defendant was entitled to the court's discretion, even though he fell within the
excepted cases).
227. 493 P.2d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972).
228. Id. at 1234.
229. See id.
230. According to the court, due to the length of time until trial, people were able to
commit several crimes while on bail, knowing that they could raise bail for the subsequent
offenses. If convicted of the first offense, they could plea bargain as to the rest and possibly
obtain concurrent sentences. In this case, the trial court had admitted the defendant to bail
on a forgery charge allegedly committed while he was on bail for another forgery and an
armed robbery charge. Id. at 1233-34.
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before. 231  The court refused to do so and emphasized that the "only
determination" for the court to make is whether the proof is evident or the
presumption great. 232
Interestingly, in 1913 the Arizona Supreme Court cited Tinder's233
holding that in capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption
great the legislature may prohibit bail or leave it as a matter of judicial
discretion.234 Because the legislature had chosen to prohibit bail in the
excepted cases, "the granting of bail is not even discretionary, but the right
of the person thereto is forbidden by the law."'235 The Garrett court did not
discuss this case.
2. Colorado
Just two years after Garrett, the Supreme Court of Colorado also read the
language of its constitution to mandate denial of bail. 236 Unlike the
decision of the Arizona court, however, this opinion examined how other
jurisdictions have decided the issue, noting that the majority rule "may well
be" that admission to bail still remains discretionary. 237 Nevertheless, this
court read the provision to mandate the denial of bail based on its plain
language. 238 The court cited six cases in support of its departure from the
majority rule, but upon closer examination only two of these cases, from the
late 1800s, arguably support such a proposition and, even then, only in
dicta.239
Significantly, the court began its analysis by noting that, if any discretion
remained in the court, the record would "amply justify]" the granting of
231. Id. at 1234.
232. Id.
233. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
234. In re Haigler, 137 P. 423, 424 (Ariz. 1913).
235. Id.
236. People v. Dist. Court, 529 P.2d 1335, 1335-36 (Colo. 1974) (en banc).
237. Id. at 1336 (citing In re West, 88 N.W. 88 (N.D. 1901); Exparte Howell, 245 P. 66
(Okla. Crim. App. 1926); State v. Toomey, 223 A.2d 473 (Vt. 1966)). For a discussion of In
re West, Howell, and Toomey, see supra notes 193-99 and accompanying text, supra notes
201-03 and accompanying text, and supra note 226 and accompanying text, respectively.
238. See Dist. Court, 529 P.2d at 1335.
239. In re Losasso, 24 P. 1080, 1082 (Colo. 1890) ("[R]elease upon bail should not be
permitted, unless the court feels clear that the constitutional exception does not apply.");
State v. Crocker, 40 P. 681, 686 (Wyo. 1895) (holding that indictment is not conclusive of
evident proof, while noting in dicta that the constitutional right to bail terminates the
common-law discretion of the courts, "so as to give bail as a matter of right in those cases
where it is allowable"). The other three cases do not directly address this issue; they merely
contain vague dicta that only seem to carry such an inference. People ex rel. Dunbar v. Dist.
Court, 500 P.2d 358, 359-60 (Colo. 1972); Shanks v. Dist. Court, 385 P.2d 990, 992 (Colo.
1963) (en banc); People v. Spinuzzi, 369 P.2d 427, 430 (Colo. 1962) (en banc), overruled on
other grounds by People v. Kirkland, 483 P.2d 1349 (Colo. 1971) (en banc); see supra Part
I.D.3. Finally, the court cites People v. Tinder, 19 Cal. 539 (1862), which actually discredits
this proposition. See supra Part II.A.2.
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bail in this case. 240 It referred to expert testimony that confinement in jail
was having a "deleterious effect upon the defendant," to other testimony
regarding her good character and reputation, and to the fact that her five
children attended school in the community where she resided. 241 Other
evidence indicated that she was not a flight risk, while no evidence
supported the argument that she might flee. 242 Despite the lack of binding
precedent, and the district attorney's concession that bail remained
discretionary in the excepted cases, the court stated that it felt compelled to
rule otherwise, without providing further explanation why. 2 4 3
3. Pennsylvania
An 1838 case from the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Commonwealth ex rel. Chauncey v. Keeper of the Prison,244 read the
constitutional provision to prohibit bail in the excepted cases. 245 The court
reasoned that the purpose of the right to bail was to limit, not enlarge, the
judicial discretion enjoyed by the higher courts at common law.246 While it
is inconsistent with civil liberty to make the right to bail dependent on
judicial discretion, it is also "inconsistent with the certainty of punishment
due to atrocious offenders" to allow discretion in capital cases when the
proof is evident. 247 (For this latter point, the court cited no authority.)
Accordingly, the constitutional provision is mandatory in both the bailable
cases and the excepted cases. The court ultimately held that the proof of
guilt of a capital offense was not evident and, therefore, released the
defendant on bail. 24 8
4. Virgin Islands
As discussed in the Introduction, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court
recently held in Browne that the right-to-bail provision in the Revised
Organic Act preempted the local bail statute to the extent that the latter
provided for release of certain first-degree-murder defendants. 249
240. Dist. Court, 529 P.2d at 1335.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1335-36.
243. Id. at 1336. The dissent described this holding as a deprivation of the court's
discretion, reasoning that the wording of the constitution does not require such an
interpretation. Id. at 1336-37 (Erickson, J., dissenting). To support its interpretation, the
dissent cited several cases from the jurisdictions listed in Part ILA, as well as In re Lossasso,
24 P. 1080, which the majority also used to support its holding. Id.
244. 2 Ash. 227 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1838).
245. Id. at 233.
246. Id. at 232.
247. Id. at 232-33.
248. Id at 235-36, 238.
249. Browne v. People, No. 2008-022, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33, at *24 (Aug. 29,
2008); see supra notes 1- 15 and accompanying text.
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According to the court, by its plain language the right-to-bail provision
required detention of any defendant in the excepted cases. 250 At the same
time, the defense argued that the territorial statute governed release,
preempting the Revised Organic Act; it did not argue for an alternative
reading, under which the Revised Organic Act is consistent with the
legislature's decision to permit bail in the excepted cases. 251 Ultimately,
the court remanded the case to determine whether the proof was evident. 252
C. Vague Statements Reflecting an Unquestioned Presumption-Either
That Bail May Be Granted or That Bail Must Be Denied
In addition to the opinions that have directly addressed the present
conflict, countless others include suggestive, though indirect, dicta that a
reader could mistake for a decisive position.253 Some suggest that in the
excepted cases bail may be denied; 254 others that bail must be denied. 255
Although courts in only four jurisdictions have directly held that the
constitutional provision prohibits bail in the excepted cases, a significant
number of jurisdictions seem to take for granted the fact that bail will be
denied anyway. 256 These dicta do not necessarily indicate how the court
would rule if confronted with the issue, but rather may reflect that the court
has never had cause to question its presumed reading.
250. Browne, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33, at *24; see also Tobal v. People, No. 2008-
070, 2009 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 11, at *8-9 (Feb. 11, 2009) (explaining the prohibitive
interpretation upheld in Browne).
251. Browne, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33, at *16-17.
252. Id. at *2; see also People v. Austrie, No. ST-08-CR-370, 2008 V.I. LEXIS 15, at *7-
9 (Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2008) (citing Browne, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33, at *43) (deciding
to detain the defendant after finding that the proof of guilt of first-degree murder was
evident).
253. This misleadingly presumptive language also appears in opinions from jurisdictions
in which there has been a direct holding or clear dicta. See supra notes 181-82, 203 and
accompanying text.
254. See, e.g., State v. Engel, 493 A.2d 1217, 1229 (N.J. 1985) ("If the court concludes
that the State has met its burden in this respect, it may properly deny . . . bail.");
Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 296 A.2d 829, 835 (Pa. 1972) (noting in dicta that the drafters
failed to expand the cases in which "bail may be denied" to include those punishable by life
imprisonment); Roll v. Larsen, 516 P.2d 1392, 1392 (Utah 1973).
255. See, e.g., Exparte Burgess, 274 S.W. 423, 426 (Mo. 1925) (en banc) ("[Blail is not a
matter of right, and should be refused."); State ex rel. Murray v. Dist. Court, 90 P. 513, 514
(Mont. 1907); In re Thomas, 93 P. 980, 982 (Okla. 1908) (using the phrase "bail should be
refused" while considering the standard for proof is evident).
256. See, e.g., Renton v. State, 577 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Ark. 1979) (en banc) (holding that
the burden rests on the state "to prove its assertion that the petitioner is constitutionally
precluded from being released on bail because the proof is evident or the presumption
great"); Ford v. Dilley, 156 N.W. 513, 530 (Iowa 1916) ("[T]he proof cannot be said to be so
evident as to preclude admission to bail." (citations omitted)); State v. Hamilton, 190
N.W.2d 862, 863 (Neb. 1971) ("[The constitution] renders murder a nonbailable offense
'where the proof is evident or the presumption great."' (quoting NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9)).
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For example, the dicta that bail "may be denied" may reflect either an
understanding that bail would still be discretionary in the excepted cases or
an intention to use the word "may" strongly. 257 The dicta that bail "should
be denied" may convey the limits of judicial authority or may simply
describe a rule of judicial custom, imposed on the courts by their own
practice, as occurred at common law.258 This judicial practice is so well
entrenched, and this provision so open ended, that it is understandable that
some courts simply do not question the presumptive meaning.259 In such
cases, as at common law, the determination whether the proof is evident
often collapses into a decision whether the defendant poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community.260
D. Implications of the Recent Constitutional Amendments for This Conflict
The amendments discussed in Part I.D.4 permit (or mandate, depending
on the jurisdiction's interpretation of the disputed language) the denial of
bail for certain offenses if necessary to ensure the defendant's appearance at
trial and/or the safety of the community. 261  These flight and harm
exceptions add an additional level of analysis to the right to bail,
accompanying the traditional qualification that the proof be evident or the
presumption great. Reconciling the implications of these amendments is
difficult for both sides of the conflict. The addition of these flight and harm
exceptions may herald the increasing relevance of the proof-evident
standard, as it applies to an expanding category of excepted cases, or the
beginning of its obsolescence, as this dual standard exposes the weaknesses
of the proof-evident standard.
On one hand, this additional standard may make it harder to argue that
the constitutional provision preserves discretion to grant bail in the
excepted cases upon a further finding that the defendant does not pose a
risk of flight or danger. The drafters knew how to specify that in some
cases the court should consider, first, whether the proof is evident and,
257. See supra note 52.
258. See, e.g., Allen v. State. 174 So. 2d 538, 540 (Fla. 1965) (stating in dicta that bail is
"not obtainable" in capital offenses unless the proof is not evident); Blackwell v. Sessums,
284 So. 2d 38, 39 (Miss. 1973); State v. Konigsberg, 164 A.2d 740, 745 (N.J. 1960).
259. Several cases seem to take for granted that the sole factor to consider is whether the
proof is evident. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 133 S.W. 1017, 1018-19 (Ark. 1911); State v.
Menillo, 268 A.2d 667, 670 (Conn. 1970).
260. See, e.g., Konigsberg, 164 A.2d at 743 ("The underlying motive for denying bail in
the prescribed type of capital offenses is to assure the accused's presence at trial .... But
when it does not appear on the facts adduced... that the defendant is reasonably in danger
of a conviction of murder in the first degree, not only is the strong flight urge missing, but
the basic right to conditional release is imperatively present."); Exparte Kittrel 20 Ark. 499,
507 (1859) ("If there is a probability that the accused is guilty of a capital offence, his
detention for trial is of the utmost importance to the public, and a bail bond is a doubtful
mode of securing his presence at the trial .... ").
261. See also supra note 122 and accompanying text (describing the relevant provisions).
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second, whether the defendant is dangerous or a flight risk. By not
specifying this second step in all cases, courts could interpret the lack of an
express flight or harm exception not as silence, but as direction to end
analysis after determining that the proof is evident, effectively prohibiting
bail in the excepted cases. 262
On the other hand, if bail is prohibited in the excepted cases, the further
determination of whether the defendant poses a flight risk or danger for
only some offenses is likewise problematic. It begs the question whether
the proof-evident standard adequately represents the primary purposes of
pretrial detention-that is, ensuring the defendant's presence at trial and
protecting the public safety. If the strength of the evidence truly reflects the
likelihood of flight risk or danger, then the extra step added by these recent
amendments would be redundant. If it does not reflect this likelihood,
however, the traditional state constitutional right-to-bail standard would be
uniquely divorced from the underlying purposes of bail, unlike other state
and federal bail standards. 263 By interpreting the provision to prohibit bail
in some cases when the proof is evident, and in other cases when the proof
is evident and the defendant poses a flight risk or danger, it becomes
difficult to argue that the strength of the evidence is an airtight proxy for the
underlying purposes of bail.
III. LOOKING FORWARD
This Note has examined what, if anything, the state constitutional right to
bail leaves to legislative and judicial discretion. Statutory interpretation
begins and ends with the plain language of the provision only if that
language is unambiguous. 264 If it is ambiguous, other considerations, such
as the drafters' intent and policy implications, become relevant. In this
case, the plain language, drafters' intent, and policy implications of the
provision all compel the conclusion that the right to bail leaves room for
262. By the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or "the expression of one is the
exclusion of the other," the clear expression of a general flight or harm exception implicitly
negates the existence of this further determination for capital offenses and offenses
punishable by life imprisonment when the proof is evident. Cf Leatherman v. Tarrant
County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Gozlon-
Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23
(1983). But see REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 234-
35 (1975); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 282 (1985)
(noting that this maxim has become disfavored, as it is based on the assumption of
legislative omniscience).
263. See WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2 ("All persons, before conviction, shall be eligible
for release under reasonable conditions designed to assure their appearance in court, protect
members of the community from serious bodily harm or prevent the intimidation of
witnesses."); Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2006).
264. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000).
2009]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
judicial and legislative discretion to permit or deny bail in the excepted
cases.
Part III.A argues that the provision's grammatical structure, combined
with its drafters' intent, implies that it is silent regarding the excepted cases,
leaving room for the legislature and judiciary to decide whether to permit
bail. Part III.B advises that, while the strength of the evidence is an
important factor in bail decisions, policy considerations require that this
factor be relevant only to the extent that it serves the primary purposes of
bail-assuring the defendant's presence at trial and the safety of the
community.
A. The State Constitutional Right to Bail Preserves the Common-Law
Discretion To Grant Bail in Any Case
The operative language of the constitutional provision-"shall be
bailable"-acts directly upon all cases except those excluded from the
guarantee. 265 The provision, therefore, is silent regarding the excepted
cases. 266  Although not dispositive of the question, several canons of
interpretation favor a narrow construction of the exception to the right to
bail. To begin with, exceptions within a statute generally should be read
narrowly. 267  Courts also should construe strictly statutes that derogate
from the common law or have a punitive component. 268 Moreover, the
provision's location in the constitutional bill of rights reinforces the need to
read the exception narrowly. 269 It would be strange, and perhaps even
dangerous, to deny implicitly an opportunity enjoyed at common law in a
vehicle purported to define and guarantee individual rights. 270 Such a
limitation on individual rights should require an express statement so that
the people understand the legal implications of the provision when ratifying
it. Because this provision is silent regarding the excepted cases, it must be
read to preserve their treatment at common law.2 71
As discussed in Part I.C, the decision to grant bail at common law was
ultimately discretionary in all cases. 272 The only external limitations on
early English bail were statutory, and they bound only the sheriffs and the
265. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
266. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 61, 223 and accompanying text; see also Bergna v. State 102 P.3d
549, 551 (Nev. 2004) (discussing the general rule that the court liberally construe ambiguous
criminal provisions in the defendant's favor).
269. See supra notes 151, 171, 214 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court of
Alabama's statement in Ex parte Croom, 19 Ala. 561, 571 (1851), that it "would seem
somewhat paradoxical to hold, that in a bill of rights, the convention should have put the
negative of a common law right beyond the power of legislative control").
271. See supra notes 61, 223 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 64, 101-03 and accompanying text.
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justices of the peace. 273 These limitations did not apply to the Court of
King's Bench, to whom state judges are best analogized. 274 Even though
these judges usually followed the clear statutory guidelines in setting or
denying bail, this custom was a self-imposed practice, not a limitation on
their judicial authority. 275  Therefore, at common law, bail was
fundamentally discretionary for the excepted cases. 276
At best, the provision's plain language favors the retention of discretion
to permit bail in the excepted cases. At worst, it is ambiguous. Arthur,
Harnish, West, and the dissent in District Court either expressly or
effectively based their conclusions that bail remains discretionary on the
plain language alone. 277  The courts in District Court and Browne
interpreted the provision to prohibit bail on its face. 278 This disagreement
demonstrates a level of ambiguity that requires consideration of other
factors, beginning with the drafters' intent.
One of the strongest arguments for the prohibitive interpretation is the
historical fact that the definition of bailable and nonbailable offenses
emerged to prevent abuses of judicial discretion. 279 In order to equalize
access to bail and to limit the excessive granting of writs by the justices of
the peace, Westminster strictly regulated bail according to the category of
offense and strength of proof.280
This argument, however, has several flaws. To begin with, as discussed
above, the early English bail statutes restricted the discretion of the justices
of the peace, not of the King's Bench judges. 281 Even though these rigid
statutory guidelines still influenced the King's Bench judges, the state
constitutional right to bail served an entirely different purpose than the
early statutory scheme did. While the statutory scheme developed to
prevent abuses of judicial discretion, 282 the right to bail developed to
protect against this draconian legislation. 283  The statutory scheme had
become so rigid that only misdemeanors were bailable as of right.2 84 The
purpose of the constitutional right to bail was to eliminate the authority of
273. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 176, 211, 222-23 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 166, 174, 193-96, 243 (reasoning based on the language of the
provision alone that bail remains discretionary).
278. See People v. Dist. Court, 529 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1974) (en banc); Browne v. People,
No. 2008-022, 2008 V.I. Supreme LEXIS 33 (Aug. 29, 2008); supra notes 238, 249 and
accompanying text (reasoning that the plain language requires the denial of bail).
279. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 75-78, 89-91 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 70, 89 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 147 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 212-13 and
accompanying text (explaining that states included liberal bail provisions in their
constitutions because judges exercised their discretion oppressively).
284. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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the legislature to define certain offenses as nonbailable. 285 Therefore, the
intent to limit judicial discretion cannot be imputed to the constitutional
right to bail.
The case law supports this explanation of the original intent. Croom and
Arthur agreed that the purpose of the right to bail was to prevent
excessively prohibitive legislation. 286 Only Chauncey clearly reasoned that
the right to bail was intended to remove judicial and legislative discretion
entirely, due to early abuses. 287  That case, however, is of weak
precedential value, as it is from a Philadelphia county court and is not
commonly followed in Pennsylvania. 288
Finally, the recent amendments to the constitutional bail provisions do
not support the prohibitive interpretation.289 While these amendments raise
questions for both sides of the conflict, they do not necessarily reflect a
deliberate decision to interpret the provision as prohibitive. Since the initial
drafting of this disputed language, some states have made their provisions
expressly prohibitive, 290 perhaps because they were alerted to the
ambiguity of the initial wording. Presumably, if the drafters of the recent
amendments intended to prohibit bail upon the determination that the proof
is evident, they had access to more direct models of how to do so.
It is more likely that the discrepancies highlighted by these amendments
simply reflect the ambiguous and confusing nature of the disputed
language, which caused the drafters to specify that flight and safety must be
relevant to the bail determination. The inclusion of this further step
highlights the inadequacy of a single factor determination based on the
strength of the evidence. The proof-evident standard has long been a proxy
for the purposes of bail-ensuring the defendant's appearance at trial and
protecting the public safety. It is disturbing to assume that, because the
flight and harm exceptions are not expressly stated for some cases, they are
not to be considered. After all, these are the very considerations presumed
to be captured by the proof-evident standard.
285. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
286. See Ex parte Croom, 19 Ala. 561 (1851); State v. Arthur, 390 So. 2d 717 (Fla.
1980); supra notes 147, 167-71 and accompanying text.
287. See Commonwealth ex rel. Chauncey v. Keeper of the Prison, 2 Ash. 227 (Pa. Ct.
C.P. 1838); supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
288. The reasoning of this case is also questionable because it describes pretrial detention
as "punishment" without any qualification. Supra note 247 and accompanying text.
Although State v. Garrett, 493 P.2d 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) made a similar argument, the
intent to which that court referred was the intent of the drafters to amend the provision to
expand the excepted cases, not the intent of the earlier drafters who had written the disputed
language. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Part II.D.
290. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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B. The Ultimate Decision To Detain or Release a Defendant Before Trial
Must Always Be Tethered to the Purposes of Bail
Bail is not intended to punish the accused. 29 1  Rather, bail and
conditional release are designed to ensure that the accused appears at trial
and does not threaten the public safety in the meantime. 292 Historically, the
only reason to treat capital defendants differently than others was the
greater risk they posed of defeating the purposes of bail. 293 While the
strength of the prosecution's case is a good proxy for the likelihood that a
defendant will flee or be dangerous, it is subsidiary to the primary purposes
of bail. The connection between this proxy and the purposes of bail is not
airtight.
Over time, the tail has begun to wag the dog. The proof of guilt, which
should be subsidiary to the risk of flight and danger,294 has become
dominant over the defendant's interest in liberty, the judiciary's interest in
retaining authority over bail decisions, and society's interest in the
separation of powers and presumption of innocence. Detention is civil, as
opposed to punitive, because of its prospective interest in ensuring the
public safety and integrity of the judicial process. 29 5 If a factor, such as the
strength of the proof of guilt, comes to dominate these regulatory purposes,
then detention comes dangerously close to punishment before conviction.
People v. District Court is a prime example of the severing of the bail
decision from its regulatory purposes. In that case, the court observed that
the defendant did not pose a risk of flight.2 96 The court cited ample
evidence supporting her release but felt compelled by the language of the
constitutional provision to order detention. 29
7
In fact, none of the courts that interpreted the provision as prohibitive
based their decisions on the policy implications of using proof of guilt as a
substitute for flight risk and danger. That is, not one reasoned that bail
should be prohibited because the connection between the proxy and the
primary purposes of bail is airtight. Rather, they based their decisions to
deny bail on the text of the provisions or on the historical role that the
strength of the evidence has played in bail decisions, as opposed to the
actual correlation between the proof of guilt and the likelihood of flight or
danger in the cases before them.298 Disturbingly, it is in the very cases
291. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
296. See People v. Dist. Court, 529 P.2d 1335, 1335-36 (Colo. 1974) (en banc); supra
note 242 and accompanying text.
297. See Dist. Court, 529 P.2d at 1335; supra note 241 and accompanying text.
298. See generally supra Part ll.B.
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where the strength of evidence fails to serve as a good proxy that this
disconnect is most likely to arise.
The constitutional provision is only half the battle, as the legislature can
prohibit bail in the excepted cases anyway. An outright prohibition on bail
based on the category of offense and strength of the evidence, however, is
unnecessary and has grave policy implications. To begin with, as pretrial
detention hinders the ability of the accused to assist in his own defense, the
proof-evident standard becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, detained
defendants are more frequently convicted, not necessarily because they are
guilty, but often simply because they were imprisoned before trial. 299
In addition to increasing protection of individual rights, the discretionary
interpretation is preferable because it preserves the separation of powers.300
The "power to bail is incident to the power to hear and determine." 301 The
ultimate discretion to grant bail is essential to performing the judicial
function. 30 2 Even though it is within the authority of the legislature to
define bailable and nonbailable offenses, it should do so with respect for the
fact that the court, drawing on its vast experience, is in a better position to
determine the credibility of the defendant. The creation of the right to bail
left behind a small percentage of cases in which the court has discretion to
order pretrial detention or conditional release if convinced that the
defendant will not pose a risk of flight or danger. Perhaps very few
defendants will appeal to this discretion. In these special cases, however, it
is unjust and improper to prohibit the court from exercising its power to
release the accused on bail.
The justice system should preserve the spirit of historical practice
without tethering itself to enmeshed, outdated values. The category of the
offense and the weight of the evidence have long been fundamental to the
organization of the American bail system. These factors continue to be
useful in defining the category of defendants excluded from the bail
guarantee and in illuminating the defendant's likelihood to flee, to be
dangerous, or to tamper with witnesses. 30 3 They should not, however,
dispose of the issue. When this archaic language took root in the American
bail system, the proof-evident standard made more sense in its role as a
299. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (listing scholarly work that argues that this
correlation is due to the increased difficulty of assisting in one's own defense while in
prison); see also supra note 172 and accompanying text (weighing the individual's interest
in liberty against the state's interest in obtaining his appearance at trial, and holding that the
latter does not so outweigh the former as to justify the denial of bail as a matter of law).
300. See supra note 210.
301. E.g., People v. Shattuck, 6 Abb. N. Cas. 33, 37 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878); see, e.g., In re
Chin Wah, 182 F. 256, 258 (D. Or. 1910); Bottom v. People, 164 P. 697, 698 (Colo. 1917)
(noting, however, that this power can be limited by statute).
302. Shattuck, 6 Abb. N. Cas. at 37; cf United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 25 (C.C.D. Va.
1807) (No. 14,692b) (noting that the power to detain is necessary to the discharge of the
court's functions and, although not expressly granted, implied in judicial powers).
303. See Lim, supra note 22, at 601-02.
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single-factor determinant than it does today. At that time, the strength of
the evidence may well have been the best way to predict whether the
defendant would appear at trial. 304 Today, however, courts have greater
resources to protect against flight, including electronic monitoring, passport
surrender, and advanced communication in law enforcement. 305
Additionally, other factors, such as the defendant's reputation, resources, or
community ties, may actually be more accurate predictors of flight risk than
the strength of the prosecutor's case before trial. 306
CONCLUSION
Bail has changed drastically since early common law, and yet it has not
changed at all. Although modem society offers more accurate ways to
predict which defendants pose a risk of flight or danger to the community,
some jurisdictions cling to an outdated standard based purely on the
category of the offense and the strength of the evidence. This standard has
long been a useful proxy for the true purposes of bail, and the framers of the
various state constitutional right-to-bail provisions intended it to be no more
and no less. While the standard limits the cases in which bail may be
denied, other factors, such as the defendant's financial resources, character,
community ties, and employment, should also influence whether the
defendant is detained or conditionally released. To transform this standard
into the sole, determinative factor in bail decisions would subvert the
framers' intention.
304. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text; see also Bail, supra note 21, at 967
(suggesting that the expanding frontier and consequent ease of flight made the bail system
more rigid).
305. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; see generally Lim, supra note 22, at 601
(discussing the correlation between the likelihood a defendant will appear at trial if released
on bail and the probability of capture if he flees).
306. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) ("'[T]here is nothing
inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."') (quoting Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)); JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, Two CLASSES OF ACCUSED: A
STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 92-95 (1979).
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307. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
308. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 127 accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
